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Factor analysis, multiple discriminant analysis, re-
gression analysis, and scalogram analysis were utilized to
determine whether data supported a unidimensional or a mul-
tidimensional theory of moral development; second whether or
not there was a correlation between development in moral
judgment and development in specific personality attributes.
Thirty-four female subjects, ages 17 to 27 years, re-
sponded in writing to a collection of six of Kohlberg's mor-
al dilemmas presented in story form in a short paragraph.
The dilemmas covered all eight of the moral issues identi-
fied by Kohlberg : life, punishment, personal contracts,
conscience, authority, civil rights, private property, and
a citizen's role.
The subjects also answered four personality measures.
Berkowitz's Social Responsibility Scale , a measure of tradi-
tional values; Christie and Geis's test of Machiavellianism ,
a measure of one's beliefs about human nature and one's tend
Vi 1
ency to manipulate others for one's own advantage; Schwartz's
test of Ascription of Responsibility
,
a measure of a person’s
tendency to ascribe responsibility to the self for others'
welfare; and Eiseman's Measure of Personality Development
,
a
complex measure designed to reveal a subject's developmental
profile on five dimensions or poles: Pole 1, Absolutism,
Glorification of Authority; Pole 2, Freedom From, Negativ-
ism; Pole 3, Dependency, Social Anxiety; Pole 4, Self-absorp-
tion; Pole 5, Active Interdependence, Collaboration.
An R factor analysis of the subjects' moral issue
scores, using a principle-factor solution, revealed one
overall initial unrotated factor, indicating that all the
issues measured one basic cons truct . An oblique factor rota-
tion indicates two issue dimensions which were labelled so-
cial role responsibility, and legal rules; a possible third
issue dimension was tentatively identified and labelled pun-
ishment .
A Q factor analysis of the subjects revealed that the
subjects clustered into four groups. A discriminant analy-
sis indicated that the four groups could be differentiated
from each other in terms of each group of subjects' factor
scores on each issue dimension.
Regression analysis indicated no significant correla-
tion between the subjects' scores on each personality mea
sure and each issue dimension. Scalogram analysis indicated
that the issues dimensions could not be ranked on an under-
VI 1 1
lying dimension of difficulty.
Suggestions for future research are discussed along
with the implications of these findings for a theory of mor
al development. Finally the results are discussed in terms
of their implications for educational policy and instruc-
t ion
.
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CHAPTER I
ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY THE NATURE OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to extend research in
moral development by addressing the problem of multidimen-
sionality in moral reasoning. Kohlberg, a major investi-
gator in this field, suggests that the development of moral
reasoning occurs in terms of increasing differentiation
along a single dimension. An alternative theory would be
that moral reasoning develops by a dual process: first, in
terms of increasing growth in the number of dimensions an
individual can use in making a moral judgment (differentia-
tion) ; second, in terms of increasing growth in the number
of discriminations an individual can make on each dimension
(articulation)
.
The problem. This study will attempt to decide which
theory best conceptualizes the process of moral development.
If the data support a multidimensional theory, I will at-
tempt to identify some of the most basic dimensions. Fin-
ally, an effort will be made to determine if there is a
correlation between development in moral judgment and de-
velopment in specific personality attributes.
The justification of_ the study . This study, it is
hoped, will add clarity to the theory of moral
development.
2A theory of moral development which permits the identifica-
tion of dimensions of development suggests the possibility
of reporting and studying an individual's moral reasoning in
terms of a "profile." Such a profile would constitute a
series of ratings on identified dimensions. The concept of
a profile gives a more individualized, precise, and more
useful (in diagnostic terms) picture of a person's cognitive
moral development.
A second desired effect of this study would be the de-
velopment of appropriate instructional aids which would fos-
ter the development of moral judgment. Kohlberg and Mayer
(1972) suggest that there is what approaches an optimal
period for movement from one stage of development to the
next. When a child has first attained a given stage, he is
unlikely to respond to stimulation toward the next stage.
In addition, after a long period of use of a given stage of
thought, a child tends to "stabilize" at the stage and to
develop screening mechanisms for contradictory stimulation.
In between these opposite end points is an "open period" in
which the child is receptive to growthful stimulation. This
fact suggests fostering development by presenting stimula-
tion in those open periods when the possibility for develop-
ment is optimal, thereby preventing stage retardation.
At present, development is conceptualized to occur as
the result of the child's discovering that his own stage of
reasoning is inadequate compared to reasoning which is one
3stage above his own. Therefore, in order to foster growth,
it is proposed that the teacher must present the child with
examples of reasoning which are one stage above the child's
own. The idea of one teacher selectively evaluating each
student's reasoning, identifying his appropriate stage, and
then responding with an appropriate, stimulating alternative
is proposing a great deal, especially in a class of twenty-
five to thirty students.
However, if moral development in the child occurs as
proposed in this theory, i.e., in terms of increasing abil-
ity to discriminate on different dimensions, there might be
a second source of developmental conflict. That is, a con-
flict between levels of reasoning on each dimension. The
students' prior and prolonged association with some issue
dimensions as compared with others might result in a tempor-
arily unequal development across dimensions but ultimate
growth. Such a model suggests that the teacher might sti-
mulate the child with breadth of issue exposure as well as
exposure to reasoning one level higher than the child's own.
In addition, it is hoped that this study will contri-
bute to the future development of a machine scorable measure
of moral judgment. If a correlation exists between person-
ality variables, and stage of moral reasoning, the regres-
sion of each set of scores from the personality measures on
scores from Kohlberg's criterion measure could provide the
basis for prediction of a subject's performance on specific
4moral reasoning tasks.
At a future time an item analysis of the questions
within the personality measures which accounted for the
largest amount of the variance in the regression equation
could be used as a base from which to develop a separate
machine scorable estimate of moral judgment.
Such a measure would offer at least two major advan-
tages over Kohlberg's present measure. First, it would per-
mit greater scoring reliability than is presently available
using an open-ended essay technique. Second, it would per-
mit easier assessment of large numbers of subjects.
Finally, most recent interest in the concept of moral
development has led to the creation and incorporation of
moral development concepts in public school curricula (Sel-
man, 1973; Fenton, 1975). If moral development concepts are
to come into widespread use in public education, the crea-
tion of valid methods of assessing moral development are
essential for aid in determining appropriate instructional
techniques and for accurately measuring the effects of ex-
perimental treatments or educational efforts. Moreover, if
identification of adaptive or retarded development is to be
considered important, accurate measures are important for
reliably and especially equitably identifying such shifts.
It is toward the furthering of all these goals which this
study hopes to contribute.
5P r 6v i ou s A 1 1 snip t s t o Clarify the Dimensionality and
Psychological Correlates of Moral Development
Three philosophical positions
Psychological theories of moral development all draw
upon basic philosophical conceptions of the nature of the
human organism at birth. These philosophical approaches can
be divided into three theories: a soul tainted by ’original
sin'; a soul bare as a clean slate, or a soul born in a
state of innate purity. These differing conceptions of man
and their related theories of development lead psychological
theories of development to focus upon different types of
phenomena, methods of inquiry, and forms of explanation. In
the next few pages, I will outline the approach of each phi-
losophical theory and its related psychological theory of
morality. The remainder of the chapter will focus on the
major tenets of developmental theory as they are espoused by
Piaget, Cezel, and Kohlberg.
Three basic psychological approaches
The theory of ’ original sin ’ -- Psychoanalysis
The philosophical approach which assumes that at birth
the child is affected by 'original sin' has its correlates,
in modified form, in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis assumes
that early intervention into the young child's life is
ne-
6cessary to direct the infant's drives toward appropriate so-
cial objectives. This theory sees man as basically affect-
ive and irrational. Man or woman is viewed as constantly
responding to, and defending against, internal (instinctual)
urges and external (physical and social) stimuli in order
to meet internalized ideals. Failure to meet these ideals
is viewed as producing guilt, i.e., self-blame or need for
self -punishment
,
which manifests itself in self -punitive be-
haviors. This theory, therefore, defines morality in terms
of conformity to specific internalized ideals.
All responses to violations of internalized ideals (ex-
cept hiding and enjoyment) are considered possible expres-
sions of guilt, since all involve painful or effortful con-
sequences of transgressions which may satisfy the need for
punishment and self-blame. This conception of guilt sug-
gests that it may be possible to infer the existence of an
internal standard of normative demands (conscience or mor-
ality) from self-punitive responses.
Most research conducted on morality in relation to psy-
choanalytic theory has therefore focused on measures of re-
sponses to transgression and considered these measures to
also be measures of guilt. This approach assumes, of course,
that observable responses to transgression are expressive of
guilt or remorse, i.e., that self-blame reactions genuinely
inflict psychic pain upon the self rather than being instru-
mental responses to a situation.
7The results of studies in this area support the view
that naturally occurring self-blame after transgression is
more than an instrumental response. According to Kohlberg
(1963, pp . 287-288), "self-blame in both projective and
self-report material is positively associated with both re-
sistance to temptation and nondelinquency. All of the six
studies which related behavioral conformity indicators to
self-criticism responses found a positive relationship be-
tween the two." However, studies by Delesky (1963), Aron-
freed (1960), and Kohlberg (1962) suggest that the most ba-
sic observable responses assumed to be measures of guilt,
confession and self-criticism, are really techniques for
dealing with a specific transgression, that is transgression
of internalized ideals related to concern about approval.
In terms of a child's ego development these techniques in-
crease with age as children become more capable of antici-
pating disapproval reactions; however, they decrease in fre-
quency with the advent of adolescence.
Kohlberg (1963) concludes that manifest expressions of
guilt, such as self-criticism and confession, as measured by
projective instruments, reflect socialized concerns about
good or bad behaviors. Individuals capable of sclf-criti
cism when they fail or deviate also resist temptation more
than individuals incapable of self-criticism. Guilt, there-
fore, may be interpreted as a measure of developmental ad-
vancement on a continuum of individual control over personal
8behavior. However, because specific guilt responses de-
crease with the advent of adolescence, guilt as conceived
by psychoanalytic theory, as a self-puni tive reaction, does
not explain social
-developmental research observations on
guilt or allied responses.
The theory o f the blank slate --Behaviorism
This theory assumes that the child is neither corrupt
nor pure but malleable. This philosophy in modified form is
held by most behaviori sts
. In the history of philosophical
thought this theory has maintained the assumption that ex-
ternal forces impinge upon the child's sensorium and leave
elementary impressions. John Locke maintained that the mind
is an empty slate before sensory impressions mark it.
Ideas, as Hume describes them, are merely the faint images
of these impressions. According to Hume, these images are
the elements or simple ideas that make up the 'mind,' and
complex ideas are the association of elementary or simple
ideas. Therefore, in accordance with this philosophical
perspective the growth or development of the 'mind' consti-
tutes the quantitative accumulation and association of ele-
ments supplied by the environment.
In contemporary psychology this philosophical position
focuses observation upon behavioral reactions that the child
can be observed to make in response to environmental stimu-
lation. This theory defines morality in terms of specific
9acts. These acts are judged as 'good' in terms of some cul-
turally shared standard of conduct. Modeling stimuli are
theorized to convey information to observers about the
characteristics of appropriate responses. In turn, modeled
behavior is theorized to be performed on the basis of re-
wards and punishments.
The research conducted is primarily designed to isolate
the efficient cause, or antecedent condition, that leads to
the child's behavior. Growth is conceived as the accumula-
tion and strengthening of observable response patterns due
to initial and secondary causes. In contrast to develop-
mental and psychoanalytic theory, behavioral theory, in
practice, is essentially reductionist ic in its search for
efficient causality as an adequate explanatory principle.
It assumes that behavior, however complex, is the effect of,
and may therefore be analyzed into, antecedent elements.
The theory of innat e purity - - Development
This theory postulates that man is born in a state ol
innate purity and that he is an active agent in his own de-
velopment. It assumes that humans spontaneously initiate
their own actions, theyplaya constructive role in their own
psychological experience and development. The theory has
its psychological origins in two major philosophers of the
eighteenth century: Jean Jaques Rousseau, and Emmanul Kant,
who, in turn, have their own spokesmen among present day dc-
velopmental psychologists: Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohl-
berg
.
Rousseau explains his theory most concretely in his
works, The Social Contract and Emile
,
a treatise on the ear-
ly childhood of a fictional young boy. Kant formulated a
more complex conception of this autogenetic thesis in his
works, the Critique of Pure Reason and the Founda tion of the
Me taphy sics of Morals . I will devote a few sentences to
Kant’s logical analysis of this theory because it sets the
stage for understanding the basic conceptual differences
among developmental psychologists. Second, it helps to ex-
plain the basic philosophical assumptions underlying Kohl-
berg’s psychological conception of moral development.
Kant argued that human beings are organic systems.
This argument held that the organism is ’self-organizing':
it has 'self-moving power' and ' self - formative power.'
While the organism has no knowledge of these powers, they
permit it to generate or construct its own growth. It is as
if the development of organisms represented a directedness
toward ends imminent in their own organization. Kant argued
that these assumptions are possible because the most import-
ant character ist ic of organic structures is that they have
functions; that is, they are both agencies (means) for ac-
tion and the end products (purposes) toward which action is
directed
.
In ethical argument these premises, as espoused by
Kant, lead to one very important conclusion and one very im-
portant corollary. The conclusion is that the responsibil-
ity for a person's defining his/her character is with him/
herself. Ihis is what is implied by the layman's concept of
personal integrity. A set of values or moral code, self
chosen, to which an individual holds him or herself person-
ally responsible. The corollary to this conclusion is that
no person should introduce a force into another person's
life which would cause that person to commit an action he or
she cannot chose to do. Forcing someone to act without per-
mitting him or her the opportunity to chose it reduces the
individual to a means of action and deprives the person of
part of his or her basic function; that is, it prevents
self -formulated action. Kadish and Kadish (1973) illustrate
this point very clearly.
People recognize that they must justify under-
taking an action when they see the action as af-
fecting the interests and preferences of other per-
sons, but not usually when they see it as affect-
ing only themselves. Thus there was no need for
Robinson Crusoe to justify undertaking any action
until his man Friday appeared. Of course, Crusoe
could have continued taking all his actions on him-
self, merely expanding the range of those actions
to include Friday. But to have done so would have
denied Friday's existence as a person. If Friday
was to be his own man, and not merely Crusoe's,
Crusoe became obliged to justify undertaking his
actions, and hence to begin the search for propo-
sitions of appropriateness. . . .
Of course, the principle that people must jus-
tify undertaking an action when others are affected
is based on a system of values, and not logical
necessity. It flows from an underlying commitment
that other people are entitled to he treated as
autonomous and free beings rather than as mani-pulable things-
- a commitment that has informed not
only the Rechtsphilosphie of Kant and Hegel, but
the entire Western liberal tradition (pp. 12 - 13 ).
The development of cognitive structures
Contemporary developmental theory is based on Kant's
autogenetic hypothesis of the processes of development. The
theory rejects the determination of efficient causality as
the primary method of discovering the most appropriate ex-
planation of human growth and learning. According to this
theory, development is proposed to occur in terms of the
growth of basic mental structures. The term "structure" is
a metaphor used to refer to the perceived relationship among
components of content (Scott, 1970, p. 145). The distinc-
tion between content and structure is not always neat. What
is structure and what is content depends on the level of
analysis. Though a structure consists of a relationship
among elements, it may itself form an element in some super-
ordinate structure; conversely, the elements of any desig-
nated structure may themselves be conceived as complex struc-
tures consisting of their own units and interactions.
There arc three basic assumptions about structural pro-
perties. First, the content of experience is organized into
structural assemblies from which any element of content de-
rives its significance. Second, the way in which any new
experience is received, processed, and interpreted depends
13
on the capabilities and characteristics of pre-existing cog-
nitive structures into which it is read. Third, while the
contents of cognition may be endlessly varied, structural
properties can be described in a limited number of genotypic
terms, thereby permitting a more parsimonious formulation of
psychological processes.
The concept of cognitive structures as developmental
phenomena makes five basic assumptions:
1) Development proceeds through a series of fixed
stages of structural development.
2) Each stage of structural development is an inte-
grated whole. That is, the central concept defin-
ing a stage is reflected in many content areas and
there is considerable consistency in the stage re-
sponses of the individual's responses.
3) In the course of development a given stage is
viewed as being integrated in the next and replaced
by it.
4) Each individual actively participates in the pro-
cess of continuing synthesis rather than adopting
a ready made new one provided by the culture.
5) Each individual must pass through all preceding
stages before he or she can move on to the next
one
.
14
The theoretical issues
Within the concept of development there is a debate
over the location of the initial source which produces ba-
sic mental structures. Developmental psychologists debate
whether the location is within the organism or in the inter-
action between the organism and the environment. The philo-
sophical theory underlying this psychological theory is less
than clear on the issue. Kent's position was "as if the de-
velopment of organisms represented a directedness toward
ends immanent in their own organization" (Supra, p. 10).
Nevertheless, his ethical theory is based firmly on the be-
lief that the individual is free from an internally program-
med template of cognitive development.
Maturat ional theory . The first position, that develop-
ment is fully determined from within the organism is exem-
plified by Gesell (1955). He poses the existence of a fixed
time period, during which a certain amount of stimulation is
required to avoid irreversible deficits. His theory presup-
poses an innate process of growth given by templates in the
genotype with an inner time schedule and an inner pattern
which can be asserted or distorted by deficits of stimula-
t ion
.
Interactive t hco ry . The second position, in contrast
to maturat ional theories, is the in teractionist theory po-
sited by deve lopmental is t s such as Piaget and Kohlberg.
These theorists assume that the basic mental structure is
15
the result of an interaction between certain organismic
structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside
world, rather than a strict template within the genotype.
In conclusion, the task of developmental psychology is
twofold: first, to determine the configuration of psycho-
logical activity that constitutes an organized stage of the
child’s life. Second, to determine the form of the preced-
ing stage, which was the source of the present stage. Par-
ticularly, developmental theorists attempt to delineate
stages in cognitive evolution. They assume that cognitive
development is intimately associated with, and the most im-
portant influence upon, all other lines of psychological de-
velopment. The primary interest of researchers in this
field is the isolation of model cases of long-term develop-
ment from concrete to abstract reasoning processes that un-
derlie the acquisition of knowledge. The formal strategy
for studies in this field has been the analysis of the evo-
lution of the actions by which children come to know and
communicate their own characteristics and their own environ-
ment. For this reason the major effort has been to deter-
mine the progressive mental stages of acting and reasoning.
Primary developmental research in moral development
P j age
t
-
- h i s theory . Piaget defines morality as respect
for rules of social order and a concern for reciprocity and
equality among individuals (Hoffman, 1970). The focus of
16
Piaget's theory is on the developmental shift in the two as-
pects of morality from respect and submission to authority,
to self-government and self-control. His theory is based on
a system of two broad stages of moral development which en-
compasses both respect for rules and a sense of justice.
The first and earlier stage is referred to variously as
moral realism, morality of constraint, or heteronomous mor-
ality. In this stage the child feels an obligation to com-
ply with rules because they are sacred and unalterable; he/
she tends to view behaviors as totally right or wrong and
thinks everyone views them in the same way. Ile/she judges
the rightness or wrongness of an act on the basis of the
magnitude of its consequences, the extent to which it con-
forms exactly to established rules, and whether or not it
elicits punishment. The child believes in "immanent jus-
tice," that is, that violations of social norms are followed
by physical accidents or misfortunes willed by God or by some
inanimate object.
In the second, and more advanced stage, variously re-
ferred to as, the morality of cooperation, the stage of re-
ciprocity, or the stage of autonomous morality, the child
no longer views rules as rigid or unchangeable but as es-
tablished and maintained through reciprocal social agreement
and therefore subject to modification in response to human
needs or other situational demands. The child's judgments
reflect a number of distinct changes from those he/she made
in the he teronomous stage. Intention to deceive becomes an
inci'c^cisingly important factor in determining judgments of
right or wrong. Punishment for misdeeds is no longer con-
ceived as impersonally ordained or meted out by God. The
concepts of duty and obligation revolve around the need for
conforming to peer expectations, expressing gratitude for
past affection and favors, and putting oneself in the other
person’s place, i.e. role taking. The child’s ideas about
how punishment should be administered also changes with
stage advancement. The former concepts of punishment neces-
sarily being painful, arbitrary, and administered by author-
ity are moderated and the child develops the concept that
punishment should "fit the crime"; that is, it should be
reciprocally related to the misdeed, for instance, through
restitution of stolen articles or retaliation by the victim
for personal injuries.
In Piaget’s theory, both maturation and experience play
a role in the transition from one stage to the next. Matur-
ation is important primarily as it affects the child's de-
veloping cognitive capacities. However, experience is also
important. The variable of interest for Piaget, in terms of
the child’s social experience, is the shift from interaction
primarily with adults, where Piaget feels social interaction
consists in large measure of the imposition of sanctions, to
increasing interaction with peers, where Piaget believes
the
interactions are by nature more likely to be mutual and
re-
18
ciprocal
.
For Piaget moral development is basically a derivitive
of cognitive development. However, he is not always clear
as to the role of social interaction in moral development.
At times he appears to present it as a catalytic agent which
advances or retards the operation of built-in timed mechan-
isms. On other occasions, social interaction appears to
constitute a central position in moral development (Hoffman,
1970). It is in his writings on development in primitive
cultures (Piaget, 1947) that he gives a central role to so-
cial interaction, in this same discussion he "seems somewhat
less inclined to view his moral stages as forming structured
wholes that develop universally in a fixed sequence" (Hoff-
man
,
1970, p . 266)
.
In Piaget's theory, three factors underlie the child's
experience in the heteronomous stage of development: first,
his belief that everyone else's views of events are the
same as his/her own, "egocentrism"; second, his/her confu-
sion of the subjective and objective aspects of experience--
for example, he/she perceives dreams as external events ra-
ther than mental phenomena, "realism" -- third , the child s
overwhelming respect for adults, which Piaget suggests is
based upon feelings toward them which include inferiority,
dependence, affect, admiration, and fear, causes feelings of
obligations to comply with commands from parents or other
adults. These feelings of obligation to comply to adult
19
commands carries over into the areas of rules and combines
with the child’s sense of "realism," rules thus become not
only fixed but also sacred and any attempt to change or
modify them is thought by the child to be wrong.
Growth to the autonomous stage is dependent upon the
loss of egocentrism and realism and the development of a
concept of the self as an integral unit capable of self-
action and self-support. It also means the recognition of
other entities and individuals as separate and distinct
from the self. Moreover, it requires the recognition that
other individuals may have points of view and perspectives
different from one's own. For Piaget these changes occur
most readily as a result of peer interactions.
Piaget believes the child becomes more confident in
his/her own abilities and attains a greater relative equal-
ity with older interaction partners as a result of physical
and social developments which occur with age growth. These
physical and social developments which occur with age growth
foster moral development as a result of two distinct pro-
cesses. First, the child begins to share in making deci-
sions. The results of this decision making in turn have an
effect on the child’s perspective toward rules and authority.
Rules are no longer experienced as coming from 'on high';
instead they are increasingly viewed as products o( agree-
ment and cooperation and amenable to change by mutual con-
sent.
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The second factor which develops from the process of
interacting with peers is the ability to take alternative
and reciprocal roles with others. Such mutual role-taking
facilitates the child’s developing awareness that he/she is
an individual who is coordinate with but different from
other individuals, thereby further helping to decrease the
child's sense of egocentrici ty . This awareness in turn also
helps to give rise to mutual respect, which is a necessary
condition for respecting rules as products of group agree-
ment and for gaining a more internalized understanding of
what they mean.
In summary, Piaget's theory postulates that moral de-
velopment is the result of an active process. This process
involves the development of the child's cognitive capacities
in conjunction with the child's experience in new and novel
social situations. These experiences provide the basis for
a broadened perspective on authority and an increased oppor-
tunity to take the role of others. The increasing develop-
ment in the child's cognitive capacities help the child in
his effort to order his new experience and to integrate it
into prior perspectives. The result of this process is a
new and "higher" level of moral orientation.
Piaget - -his research . Piaget's initial research ef-
forts in moral development (Piaget, 1932) differed from
prior research in the area of morality in that his effoits
emphasized moral reasoning instead of moral behavior or mor-
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al knowledge. His research utilized the technique he de-
veloped for measuring the level of the child’s moral reason-
ing, a technique which was relatively independent of moral
content
.
Piaget presented children with a series of brief stor-
ies, each centering on a moral issue and describing some
type of moral behavior. The stories were presented in pairs
to more than 100 Swiss children individually. The stories
were so designed that the motivation, intention, and conse-
quences varied while the nature of the behavior remained
relatively constant. For example, the following pair of
stories was intended to determine whether the child was more
concerned with motive or material results when making moral
j udgments
.
A little boy who is called John is in his room.
He is called for dinner. He goes into the dining
room. But behind the door there is a chair and
on the chair there is a tray with fifteen cups on
it. John couldn't have known there was all this
behind the door. He goes in; the door knocks
against the tray; bang go the cups, and they are
all broken!
Once there was a little boy whose name was Henry.
One day when his mother was out, he tried to get
some jam out of the cupboard. He climbed up on a
chair and stretched out his arm. But the jam was
too high up, and he couldn't reach it and have
any. But while he was trying to get it, he knocked
over a cup. The cup fell down and broke (Piaget,
1932
,
p. 122)
.
After each pair of stories, Piaget would ask questions such
as, "Are the children equally guilty? Which of the two is
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naughtiest and why?" (Piaget, 1932, p. 122).
As a means of studying the child's ability to distin-
guish among types of punishment, the following story and
questions were used.
A boy has broken a toy belonging to his little
brother. What should be done? 1. Should he not
be allowed to play with any of his own toys for a
week? (expiation); 2. Should he give the little
brother one of his own toys? (reciprocation); 3.
Should he pay for having it mended? (restitution)
(Piaget, 1932
,
p. 203)
.
"Imminent justice" was assessed by the following story.
In a class of very little children the teacher
had forbidden them to sharpen their own pencils
themselves. Once, when the teacher had her back
turned, a little boy took the knife and was going
to sharpen his pencil. But he cut his finger.
If the teacher had allowed him to sharpen his pen-
cil, would he have cut himself just the same?
(Piaget, 1932, p. 252).
Piaget's interview approach emphasized the development
of the cognitive component of moral judgment. Piaget clas-
sified responses in terms of the stage of the child's moral
development. Thus, the children were not classified as more
or less moral on the bases of their responses but were put
into classes on the bases of the developmental maturity of
their moral judgments as this was inferred from the chil-
dren's ordering of the degree of guilt they felt was repre
sented in each story; or their rank ordering of the punish-
ment the child who broke the toy should receive, or their
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belief in imminent justice.
Piaget interpreted his results in terms of eleven di-
mensions of moral development which he thought reflected
growth from a position of moral ob j ect ivi ty-
- the confusion
of subjective phenomena with objective things--to moral sub-
jectivity. The first five dimensions reflect Piaget's in-
terest in morality as respect and obligation toward rules.
1. Objective responsibility vs. intentionalism-
- this
dimension reflects the shift from the evaluation of an act
in terms of stated rules to a concern for the violator's in-
tentions in breaking a rule.
2. Rigidity of rules vs. flexibility- -a shift from be-
lief in the external nature of a rule to a recognition of
altered circumstances altering the rule.
3. Absolutism vs. relativism of value--a change in the
child's belief that there is universal agreement on what is
right or wrong to recognition that this agreement is sub-
jective and often individual.
4. What is punished is wrong vs. wrongness independent
of sanctions. According to Piaget, the young child's defin-
ition of an act as wrong is based on the fact that the child
is punished shifts to a recognition that what is wrong may
be judged so independent of sanctions.
5. Duty defined as obedience to authority vs. duty de-
fined in terms of conformity expectations of peers or equals,
and a sense of responsibility to oneself.
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The remaining six dimensions reflect developmental
growth in the child's recognition of reciprocity and equal-
ity among equals.
6. No sense of reciprocity in defining obligations vs.
defining obligations in terms of the rights of contract and
exchange
.
7. Belief in severe, painful punishment vs. restora-
tion to the victim.
8. Imminent justice vs. an understanding of naturis-
tic causality.
9. Belief in collective responsibility vs. individual
responsibility.
10. Punishment by authority vs. retaliation by the vic-
tim.
11. Favoritism by authority in distributing goods vs.
impartiality, equality, and distributive justice.
Kohlberg -
-
his theory . Kohlberg (1969) defines morality
as the prior judgment of the rightness or wrongness of an
act. Moral development consists of cognitive changes which
occur in the child's reasoning to support his/her judgment.
Kohlberg accepts the basic developmental approach of Piaget,
however, he has criticized much of the substance of Piaget's
moral developmental theory and has developed his own set of
stages based upon his own research efforts (Kohlberg, 1958,
1963a, 1963b, 1969). Kohlberg's aim is to fit the concept
of moral development into a more refined, comprehensive,
and
25
logically consistent framework than he believes that Piaget
was able to suggest.
At the outset, Kohlberg takes more literally than Pia-
get the assumptions of the cognitive
-developmental conceptu-
alization of stage growth. In terms of development, Kohl-
berg agrees substantially with Piaget that a dimension of
moral judgment must meet the following criteria. First, a
dimension of response must increase sequentially. However,
Kohlberg emphasizes that the increase must occur regardless
of the particular cultural rules or situations which chil-
dren are questioned about, and regardless of the child’s
cultural milieu. As was cited above Piaget is less certain
about the latter point. Second, Kohlberg clearly assumes
that his stages are structured wholes which form an invari-
ant and universal sequence of increasing maturity. Third,
Kohlberg and Piaget agree that development requires a de-
finition of change in the nature, pattern, or organization
of responses rather than changes in their strength. The
regularities must be represented in terms of ideal - typolo
-
gical constructs designed to depict different psychological
organizations at varying points in development. Fourth, the
qualitatively different types of organization must be se-
quential, thereby making an individual's developmental sta
tus predictable and cumulative in the sense of continuity on
an ordinal scale.
In terms of cognition, Kohlberg stresses that directed
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sequences of changes in response organization or shape al-
ways have a strong cognitive component. This stress is in
contrast with Piaget’s lack of conciseness on whether cogni-
tive or social factors shape response organization. This
emphasis also has philosophical implications in that it per-
mits Kohlberg to adopt Kant's rational philosophical assump-
tions. Kohlberg maintains that a description of the organi-
zation of the child's social responses entails a description
of the way in which he/she conceives the social world and
the way he/she conceives the self. This position holds that
the child's ability to perceive social relationships devel-
ops in the same manner in which his/her ability to perceive
logical or mathematical relationships develops, i.e. through
the child's increasing ability to create new and increasing-
ly complex cognitive structures. The willingness to locate
the source of cognitive growth principally is why Kohlberg
is so comfortable with the rational philosophical assumption
of individual responsibility.
In addition, support for the cognitive aspect of moral
development is shown in that the response organizations of
children are positively related to the changes in children's
psychometric measures of mental age.
When Kohlberg applied his conceptualizations of the
cognitive criteria to Piaget's eleven dimensions he found
that several did not meet the criteria. The dimensions
which did meet the criteria involved either a greater dif-
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fer entiation of objective and subjective aspects of value
(Piaget’s dimensions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8), or they involved a
growing ability to adhere to a self-chosen standard inde-
pendent of punishment (Piaget's dimensions 4, 7, and 9).
Piaget's dimensions which did not meet the criteria and
therefore could not be considered developmental by Kohlberg
were the dimensions concerned with reciprocity and peer ori-
entations (dimensions 5, 6, 10, and 11). The concept of
reciprocity (dimensions 6, 10, and 11) appeared to increase
in the ages six to nine, but thereafter to either stay the
same or decline. Dimension 5, the source of duty, i.e.
orientation to authority vs. conformity with peers, failed
to increase regularly with age, and did not relate regularly
with increases of IQ as was predicted. Moreover, the inter-
correlation of the moral judgment dimensions indicated a
high correlation among all dimensions except 5, 6, 10, and
11 .
Finally, Kohlberg found no evidence to support Piaget's
thesis that heteronomy derives from unilateral respect for
the adult, or autonomy from mutual respect of peers. Rather,
he found a trend indicating a negative relationship between
peer-group participation and an orientation to reciprocity.
Kohlberg (1958) found sociometric isolates to make greater
use of reciprocity than non- isolates . "A morality of reci-
procity was found to be associated with one of respect for
adult authority, but not with peer group participation
28
(Kohlberg
, 1963, p. 320)
.
In reference to Piaget's theory, Kohlberg rejects Pia-
get's dichotomy of development, heteronomy and autonomy,
viewing development as a longer term and more complex pro-
cess that consists of progression through invariant se-
quences of cognitive-structural transformations. In Kohl-
berg's theory, at each stage of moral development the same
basic moral concept is defined, but at each successively
higher stage this definition is more differentiated, more
integrated, and more general or universali zable
.
In addition, Kohlberg believes that Piaget's theory
places too great emphasis on social determinants. He be-
lieves that only the most cognitive of Piaget's moral attri-
butes satisfy the criteria of stages. In his own theory of
moral judgment, Kohlberg contends that only cognitive fac-
tors dominate.
. . .a number of the dimensions of moral judgment
studied by Piaget are really matters of content ra-
ther than cognitive form. . . . Taking cognizance
of Piaget's notions as well as those of others such
as Hobhouse (1906), Peck and Havighurst (1960), and
McDougal 1 (1908), I have attempted to define stages
of moral judgment which would meet. . .[stage] cri-
teria (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 375).
Kohlberg' s own theory consists of six developmental
stages, each of which is defined in terms of its position on
ten moral issues. The six stages are ordered into three
levels of moral orientation containing two stages each. The
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basic orientation of each level and stage follows.
Level one
. Moral value resides in external, quasi-
physical happenings, in bad acts, or in quasi-
physical needs rather than in persons and standards.
Stage ly Obedience and punishment orientation.
Egocentric defence to superior power or pres-
tige, or a troub le- avoiding set. Objective
responsibility
.
S tage 2: Naively egoistic orientation. Right
action is that instrumental ly satisfying the
self's needs and occasionally others'. Aware-
ness of relativism of value to each actor's
needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism
and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.
Leve 1 two . Moral value resides in performing good
or right roles, in maintaining the conventional
order and the expectancies of others.
Stage
_3: Good boy orientation. Orientation to
approval and to pleasing and helping others.
Conformity to stereotypical images of majority
or natural rote behavior, and judgment by in-
tentions .
Stage 4: Authority and social-order maintain-
ing orTentat ion . Orientation to "doing duty"
and to showing respect for authority and main-
taining the given social order for its own
sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.
Level three. Moral value resides in conformity by
tfhe seTT to shared or shareable standards, rights,
or duties.
Stage 5: Contractual legalistic orientation.
Recognition of an arbitrary element or start-
ing point in rules or expectations for the sake
of agreement. Duty defined in terms of con-
tract, general avoidance of violation of the
will or rights of others, and majority will and
welfare.
Stage 6: Conscience or principle orientation.
Orientation not only to actually ordained so-
cial rules but to principles of choice invol-
ving appeal to logical universality and con-
sistency. Orientation to conscience as a di-
recting agent and to mutual respect and trust.
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Kohlberg's Stage 1 is similar to Piaget's Heteronomous
Stage in that both are oriented to obedience. The differ-
ence is in the interpretation of obedience. Piaget sees the
child respecting adult sanctions on the basis of feelings of
dependency and on inability to tell right from wrong. Kohl-
berg believes that the child acts not out of respect but out
of fear of punishment. Ile/she does not respect his/her par-
ents in this instance; he/she only recognizes them as able
to apply powerful sanctions. The child's definition of
"wrong" is based on his/her hedonistic desire to avoid pun-
ishment. For Kohlberg, Piaget's elements of heteronomous
respect for rules and authority are not developed until the
third and fourth stages.
Stage 2 in Kohlberg's theory resembles Piaget's auto-
nomous stage in reference to relativism and reciprocity.
However, Kohlberg relegates the egalitarianism and utili-
tarianism of Piaget's Autonomous Stage to his own Stages 5
and 6. For Kohlberg, the Stage 2 child views reciprocity in
only a limited context of one on one--it docs not generalize
to an entire society.
At Stage 3 on Kohlberg's schema the child begins to de-
velop internalized motivation to conform to the standaid set
for others. It is not until Stage 6 that the standard
against which action is measured is internalized. At Stage
3 the standard is set by parents and significant other
adults
.
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At Stage 4, in Kohlberg's schema, the child generalizes
the standard of authority to his/her own society. This will-
ingness to obey is still hedonistic, but in a more general-
ized form. Instead of avoidance of physical harm, he/she is
concerned about the welfare of the present society as a well
regulated and organized place of existence, lie or she sees
his or her own welfare as inevitably linked with society;
cf. Hobbes, Leviathan
,
"without a certain degree of peace
and order, art, literature, science- -even the enjoyment of
the grosser physical pleasures, are all impossible and the
life of man is 'solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short'"
(Smith
,
1909
, p . 9)
.
Moral reasoning proper, in the rationalist tradition,
begins at Stage 5. At this stage, the individual attempts
to define principles on which to base judgments which have
validity and application apart from their association with
special groups, authorities, or significant others, and
apart from the individual's own identification with these
groups. At Stage 5 specifically, the individual recognizes
the relativism of personal values and opinions and conse-
quently concentrates his/her thinking upon procedural rules
for reaching consensus. The Stage 5 orientation is of re-
spect for a general social contract with a legalistic ori-
entation. In comparison to Stage 4, the law in Stage 5 is
seen as protecting general individual rights, and standards
which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the
whole society. The emphasis is on the possibility of chan-
ging the law in terms of rational considerations of social
utility. At Stage 4 the emphasis is upon freezing the law
for the sake of certainty. Moreover, the Stage 5 thinker
recognizes the possibility of conflicts between societies or
beyond the scope of prescribed law, on such occasions his/
her appeal would be to utilitarian principles.
At Stage 6, right action is defined by the decision of
one’s conscience in accordance to self-chosen principles
which meet the conditions of logical comprehensiveness, uni-
versal i zab i 1 i ty
,
and consistency. Stage 6 is anarchistic in
tendency; it assumes the possibility of an ordering of soci-
ety which rests upon a voluntary acceptance of guiding prin-
ciples.
In summary, Kohlberg accepts the overall developmental
theory, which is in contrast to psychoanalytic and social
learning theories. The latter theories assume that the so-
cial environment plays a direct modeling role and the import-
ant social experiences are those in which authorities supply
the child with ready-made standards and act in ways that
ensure the arousal of mo t i ves necessary for adop ting stand-
ards. According to the cognitive-developmental approach,
new experience is incorporated into existing cognitive
structures not in the sense of contributing additional in-
formation but through an active process in which the person
resolves contradictions between the old and the new and thus
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creates a new structure. Social experience does not lead to
a new moral orientation directly; rather, it is limited to
stimulating the individual to reorganize his/her pre-exist-
ing patterns of moral thought.
Kohlberg research
. Kohlberg has studied moral reason-
ing through the use of Piagetian- type stories which deliber-
ately involve conflict between conventional rules and human
needs. The stories were designed to reveal the mode of rea-
soning which the child is capable of using. For example,
the following story was intended to determine the child's
view of the importance of life, rules of law, punishment,
and the concept of equity when making moral judgments.
In Europe a woman was near death from a special
kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doc-
tors thought might save her. It was a form of ra-
dium that a druggist in the same town had recently
discovered. He paid $200. for the radium and
charged $2,000. for a small dose of the drug. The
sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he
knew to borrow the money, but he could only get
together about $1,000. which is half of what it
cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dy-
ing, and asked him to sell it cheaper, or
pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I
ered the drug and I'm going to make money
So Heinz got desparate and broke into the man's
store to steal the drug for his wife. Should
Heinz steal the drug? Why? (Kohlberg, 1969, p
379) .
let him
discov-
from it
Kohlberg's (1958) initial study used 75 American boys
aged 10 to 16 years and nine different stories. A factor
analysis of the 75 scores on each story revealed sufficient
loadings by each story on the first unrotated factoi to sug
gest that each story was tapping one basic factor which
Kohl berg termed "moral judgment."
In subsequent studies Kohlberg (1968) extended his re-
search to include studies using both younger and older male
and female subjects. These studies revealed no significant
difference in terms of course of development between boys
and girls (Turiel, 1966; Kohlberg and Zigler, 1967). lie has
also extended his research into different cultures using
stories which concerned similar issues hut were adapted to
the specific culture. These cultures included Great Bri-
tain, Canada, Taiwan, Mexico, and Turkey. In Taiwan for ex-
ample, the following story was used for boys in the 10 to 13
years age group.
A man’s wife was starving to death but the store
owner won’t give the man any food unless he can
pay which he can't. Should he break in and steal
some food? Why? (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 185).
The results of these studies indicate that the sequence
of the stages of development and the age trends are univer-
sal (Kohlberg, 1969) .
Turiel (1966) has found evidence that more development
takes place in a child's moral reasoning when hc/she is ex-
posed to one stage above his/her own than when he or she is
exposed to two stages above his or her own. Turiel concludes
from this evidence that stages of moral reasoning do indeed
form an invariant sequence.
Rest (1968) asked subjects to recapitulate in different
words statements representative of each stage of develop-
ment. He found that, in general, subjects can correctly re-
capitulate all stages below or at their own level; correctly
restate some, but not all statements one stage above their
own, and generally fail to recapitulate correctly statements
two or more stages above their own. Therefore, he concluded
that a subject's comprehension of moral reasoning fits a
Guttman scale. Kohlberg (1969) indicates that a subject's
usage of other stages in relation to his/her own modal stage
fits a normal distribution.
Evidence of the potential for moral judgment as a multidi-
mensional construct
As discussed above, Kohlberg believes that a given
stage response does not just represent a specific response
determined by knowledge and familiarity with a specific mor-
al dilemma or one similar to it, rather it represents an
underlying thought organization applicable to all moral di-
lemmas. However, several studies indicate that moral rea-
soning may not constitute a structured whole as such a the-
ory would predict.
Medinnus (1959) administered two Piaget-type stories to
subjects. Each story was designed to tap independently the
same moral judgment characteristic; however, he found that
on one story children seemed more advanced than on the othei
.
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Medinnus suggests that the discrepancy may have been due to
differences in the explicitness with which relevant cues
were given in the stories and the familiarity to the chil-
dren of the different incidents depicted in the stories.
Mogowan and Lee (1970) systematically investigated the ef-
fects of giving children Piaget-type stories with unfamiliar
and familiar settings and found that greater familiarity to
the stimulus material was strongly associated with the more
advanced type of moral judgment.
Gilligan, Kohlberg, Lerner and Belenky (1971) conducted
research using sexual dilemmas. They found that the level
of moral reasoning was higher on Kohlberg's standard dilem-
mas than on their sexual dilemmas, with greater discrepancy
between the standard dilemmas and the sexual dilemmas for
boys than girls.
Lieberman (1970) examined seven of Kohlberg's standard
dilemmas each involving a different set or combination of
issues. He found that the stories differed significantly as
to their degree of difficulty, where difficulty was intended
to mean fewer subjects at higher stages.
Bandura (1963) found that subjects who were pretested
for their stage of moral development were at a variety of
stages or in varying degrees of transition between stages.
Cowan, Langer, Heaverich, and Nathanson (1969) in replicat-
ing Bandura's earlier work in moral judgment also found an
admixture of stages within subjects.
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CHAPTER II
THE PROPOSED VIEW OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
The proposed view of moral development assumes that
cognitive activity can be conceptualized as a separate func-
tion, but that it is not experienced as separate from so-
cial, environmental, biological, or personality factors.
The first part of this chapter will state the structural as-
sumptions which the proposed theory of moral development
makes in reference to cognition. The second section will
suggest the relationship between personality development and
moral development and support the proposed basis for this
relationship with references to previous research. At the
end of the chapter I will summarize the proposed view and
state the six research hypotheses which I will test.
Structural Assumptions
Developmcnta 1 Learning
Developmental learning is a concept which assumes a
process of prolonged association and familiarization with
many concrete examples at one level of problem solving be-
fore the subject can reach a point where he or she begins to
observe overarching principles and relations. The concept
assumes that high familiarity with relevant perceptual units
enables the subject to operate according to more complex and
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abstract systems of rules, i.e. schemata or conceptual
structure, for combining relevant pieces of information.
In Chapter I, I noted that the distinction between con-
tent and structure is not neat; what is structure and what
is content depends on the level of analysis. In this section
of Chapter II, I will be consistent with this concept of
structure by proposing that the process whereby a structure
is created on one level is the same as that process whereby
the structure is created at the next level of analysis.
The concept of development as it is used in this theory
is a reference to the integrative complexity of an individ-
ual's system of rules for combining relevant pieces of infor-
mation. Development itself is defined as an increase in the
cognitive complexity of a system's schemata or abstract sys-
tem of rules.
Development as an increase in cognitive complexity
Cognitive complexity is defined as the tendency to con-
strue relationships in a multidimensional way, such that a
more cognitively complex structure has available a more ver-
satile system for recognizing, processing, and relating to
the information of other structures than docs a less cogni-
tively complex structure. The basis for these differences
is assumed to be represented in part by a cognitive struc
ture which can be defined and measured in terms of dimen-
sional characteristics.
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Cognitive complexity in this sense is an information
processing variable which permits the researcher to inter-
pret how an individual transforms specific information given
in a moral dilemma into a judgment of proposed action. In
this theory, three interdependent properties of information
processing structures are postulated: the development of
new dimensions, referred to as the process of differentia-
tion; the refinement of each dimension, referred to as ar-
ticulation; and the means to relate dimensions, referred to
as the integrating rules or procedures. Dimensions are the
units of conceptual functioning and represent the elements
or ’’content" of thought. In the following paragraphs I will
explain each of these properties of a cognitive structure.
First, the development of new dimensions. Judgments
concerning a moral dilemma can be based on few--or many--di-
inensional units of information. For example, in making a
judgment about the dilemma in which Heinz is placed in the
position of stealing a drug to save his wife's life, a per-
son could differentiate at least three dimensions: (1) in-
dividual needs; (2) legal rules; (3) consequences. It is
also possible that an individual may identify only one di-
mension, e.g. legal rules. The difference between these two
bases of judgment illustrates the property of differentia-
tion. The same objective stimulus may be mediated by more
or less differentiated conceptual structures. Within the
process of development, each new structure may be composed
of an increased number of dimensions representing an inde-
pendent attribute along which the stimuli can be scaled.
Second, the degree to which a dimension can be scaled
is a measure of articulation. For instance, on the legal
rules dimension, lawyers mark more points on the scale than
do lay citizens. The citizen who has not participated in
the long process of familiarizing him or herself with the
many concrete examples of a "crime" may be able to articu-
late only two categories within that dimension: misdemean-
ors which he/she considers small faults and omissions of
little consequence; and crimes, where he or she refers to
deeper and more atrocious offenses. The lawyer on the other
hand may first differentiate the concept of "crime" into two
dimensions: private wrongs or civil injuries; and public
wrongs or crimes. Then, in turn, he/she may categorize the
dimension of public wrongs into misdemeanors, felonies, and
capital offenses.
The third dimensional property of information proces-
sing structures is integration procedures. The number of
dimensions a subject perceives is not necessarily related to
the individual's integrative complexity; but the greater the
number of dimensions perceived, the more likely is the de-
velopment of integrative connections or procedures. Lack of
complexity, referred to as a low integration index, is rough-
ly synonymous with a hierarchical form of integration and a
low stage of development in which procedures arc fixed.
Schemata for organizing alternative sets of rules are not
present. Consequently, a hierarchical structure can have
a small or a large number of articulated dimensions, but the
relationship between the dimensions are relatively static
and may be expressed only simply.
A complex structure, referred to as a high integration
index, has more connections among the dimensions, i.e. there
are more schemata for forming new hierarchices
,
which gener-
ate alternative perceptions for comparing outcomes. High
integration structures contain more degrees of freedom as it
were, and are more easily changed as complex changes occur
in the data on which a moral dilemma is based.
To return to Heinz's dilemma for the purposes of illus-
tration, this legally possible but theoretically improbable
situation is postulated when Heinz steals the drug from the
druggist and a lawyer with a low level of cognitive complex-
ity advises his client, the druggist, that Heinz should be
tried for the felonious public wrong of stealing the drug.
Such action, he might argue, is justified for the benefit
of society, because by punishing every breach and violation
of the law which the state has seen proper to establish will
ensure safety and tranquility for all. Moreover, this coun-
selor might also urge the druggist to file a civil suit
against Heinz in order to recover the entire value of the
drug which Heinz stole and used. Such a situation is vei)
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proper under law and would represent a high degree of dif-
ferentiation and articulation on the dimension we have la-
belled "legal rules." But it would be a singularly simplis-
tic perception of the entire dilemma, omitting the other ob-
vious dimensions of need, consequences, motivation, or in-
tention
.
This vignette is intended to illustrate two points:
first, the interdependent properties of information proces-
sing structures; and second, that how information about the
world is represented in a person's mind makes a difference
in the way he or she performs or could perform under a va-
riety of circumstances. The focus of the general question
of the nature of cognitive structures, I believe, must in-
clude a specific question about how aspects of the pattern
of incoming data are perceived, learned, and retained for
future use. The first two properties of information proces-
sing structures, differentiation and articulation, describe
the distinctions and relations that are necessarily part of
the mental representation of the elements in a certain cog-
nitive dimension.
Dcca lage
Decalage is the theory that a mode of reasoning at its
conceptualization may not necessarily spread across all the
basic physical and social actions and concepts to which the
organizing principle potentially applies. The concept of
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decalage as first proposed by Piaget refers to a repetition
which takes place within a single period of development. It
involves a single general level of functioning. For example,
a cognitive structure, characteristic of particular Piaget-
ian stage, can first be successfully applied to task "x" but
not to task y, e.g. conservation of matter vs. conserva-
tion of volume. A year or so later the same organization
can be extended to "y" as well as "x." Moreover, the de-
velopmental process whereby "y" comes to be mastered (i.e.,
whereby the structure can successfully be applied to it) is
essentially the same as that which involved the mastery of
"x" (Flavell
,
1963).
Kohlbcrg recognizes the concept of dccalngc in the de-
velopment of moral judgment. He refers to the concept as
"stage mixture.” Lieberman (1970) has indicated that it is
not as easy to be rated at a stage on one story as on an-
other, that all stories do not discriminate equally well
among stages, and that the correlation matrix among stories
does not remain constant regardless of age. Since Lieber-
man ' s study, Kohlberg has stopped scoring on the basis of
stories (i.e., giving a story a stage score and then summing
across stories); rather, he has turned to issues, giving a
score for each issue in a story and then summing across is-
sues. This change in scoring technique does not eliminate
the problem of stage mixture; individual subjects still vary
in relation to the level of reasoning which they use on each
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issue
.
Turiel believes that the amount of stage mixture ex-
pressed by a subject’s responses is an important measure of
developmental transition. Turiel postulates several hypo-
theses about the nature of stage mixture as a developmental
measure; he presents them with separate reference to the
lower and higher stages:
1. At first, the child progresses slowly through
the very early stages and is not in a truly ac-
tive ongoing process of moral development. At
this point there should be relatively little mix-
ture since mixture is related to change.
2. After the initial phase, the child is in an
ongoing process of substantial developmental
change, at which time there would be increased
mixture since mixture is necessary for restruc-
turing
.
3. Individuals who do not attain the higher
stages by adulthood should display a moderate
leveling off of mixture, resulting in somewhat
less mixture than for individuals in the process
of development (hypothesis 2) but more than those
at earliest phases of development (hypothesis 1)
.
4. When achieving the h igher stages
,
there is
much stag e variabi 1 i ty
.
At this point
,
unstable
use of th e higher stages (rep resented by high mix-
ture ) yie Ids even higher mixt ure than that of hy-
po th esis 2 .
5. Then there is an ong oing process o f develop-
ment in t he higher stage s character i ze d by high
mixture
,
which is about equal to that of hypothe-
sis 2 but lower th an tha t of hypothes
i
s 4 (Turiel,
1969
> P- 116) .
The results of Tur iel ' s inves tigat ion (Turiel , 1969)
rined thes e hypothe ses ; s tage mixture w ithin an indiv
4 5
ual s responses is related to the developmental process.
The model for development which Turiel proposes, that incor-
porates these hypotheses, is that change occurs when per-
ceived conceptual contradictions energize attempts to re-
structure a mode of reasoning by exploring the organization-
al properties of a higher mode of thought. In this model
contradictions must be perceived by the child in such a way
that he/she is motivated to deal with the contradictory
events. If the concepts corresponding to the higher mode
of thought are presented to the child at the same time lie/
she perceives the conceptual contradiction the child may as-
similate those concepts and thereby develop new mutual as-
pirations .
The above proposal, as I view it, is insufficient. By
viewing moral development in multidimensional terms I pro-
pose to offer a more parsimonious interpretation of develop-
ment which incorporates the concept of congitive conflict
but at a lower structural level than the entire reasoning
process taken as a whole. I believe it is more appropriate
to examine the individual's ability to differentiate and
articulate a variety of dimensions which relate to moral
dilemmas. If an individual cannot differentiate or discrim-
inate on a dimension relevant to a specific moral dilemma,
then the reasoning that depends on such distinctions cannot
be observed. Even more specifically, if an issue dimension
is not articulated to the degree that other issue dimensions
within a cognitive domain are defined and articulated, inte-
grating procedures cannot be applied in all their complexity.
I su8gest, therefore, that a description of an individual's
mental representation of the relevant dimensions of a moral
dilemma would identify the boundary conditions on which the
individual is competent to perform, i.e. on the reasoning
that could conceivably be observed.
According to the theory proposed in this research is-
sues can be grouped into moral dimensions; each issue is an
instance in a concept. The issue dimensions are based upon
a structure which refers not to the individual stimuli or
issue instance as a whole but to some analysis of the stimu-
li into a set of constituent parts or aspects. These as-
pects that are distinguished and retained and that play a
functional role in cognition are not necessarily simply
classes of the physical properties of the stimulus pattern.
They may often be rather abstract properties whose relation
to the physical features of the stimulus may be quite ob-
scure. Shephard (1968) refers to the relational structures
between instances of different types in the same dimension
as "second-order isomorphisms."
Rcfering to the information processing models of Pyly-
shyn (1972) it is proposed "that people can make an unlimited
number of discriminations using only a finite set of fea-
tures, and furthermore that they can discriminate among some
rather special classes of stimuli" (p. 549). Membership in
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these special classes is not determined by any finite list
of elementary sensory properties or by logical combinations
of these elementary properties alone. Pylyshyn states that
"•
• -membership in such classes can only he characterized
by what is known in mathematics as a recursive definition.
Such a definition specifies a set of elementary symbols
(primatives) together with a set of operations that arc ap-
plied both to the elementary symbols and to the result of
the previous applications of these operations" (p. 550). In
this proposed theory a formal recursive mechanism refers to
the formal relation that holds between a concept and in-
stances of the concept, e.g. a specific moral issue dimen-
sion and specific issue instances. There are probably an
extremely large if not infinite number of distinct instances
of issues (plus a context) in one issue dimension. This
fact means that any finite specification of which instances
are in the concept must refer not to stimuli as a whole but
to some finite set of constituent parts or features. One
should not, in other words, think of the representation of
a dimension as a simple selection of some arbitrary code.
Such a representational "code" would have to be given in
terms of a prior analysis of instances into a finite set of
elementary parts or features. The fact is, that for any di-
mension that has no boundary on the number of qualifying in-
stances, in order for the relation between dimension and in-
stances to be discernable in a finite manner it must be a
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procedural definition.
For Kohlberg cognitive developmental theory is based
upon the assumption that (a) moral judgment is a role-taking
process, which (b) has a new logical structure at each
stage, paralleling Piaget's logical stages; this structure
is best formulated as (c) a justice structure which (d) is
progressively more comprehensive, differentiated, equili-
brated than the prior structure.
The present model proposes that there is an interaction
between the role-taking process which Kohlberg proposes to
occur and the procedural bases which I propose define the
development of the moral issue dimension. In my theory I
maintain that as instances of a moral issue dimension are
encountered the aspects of the issues which are used to de-
fine the dimensions change. The effect of the change in
definitional attributes provokes a change in the role-taking
process which is used to define the justice structure.
That is, one set of role-taking operations may be ap-
propriate for a specific set of issues which are included in
a moral issue dimension. When the bases for organizing that
dimension are changed by recursive definition to include a
new issue in the dimension it may create a dissonant situa-
tion in which new role-taking procedures must be utilized.
Selman (1971) found that role-taking ability was a ne-
cessary condition to reach a specific stage of moral reason-
ing. It is possible that the subject attempts a new stage
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of reasoning when by means of recursive definition a dimen-
sion becomes so well articulated that the subject is permit-
ted to utilize a more reflexive level of role-taking.
For instance, Kohlberg notes that Stage 2 role-taking
requires reciprocity or actual exchange or reversibility.
At such a stage the child may identify only one other with
whom to reciprocate. This may be an individual such as
Heinz or the druggist or it may be a dilemma in which soci-
ety or a group is the other; in the second instance the
child may anthropomorphize the group and reciprocate with
the group as he or she might with an individual. Stage 3
involves second-order role-taking or recognizing a simultan-
eous or mutually reciprocal orientation. At Stage 3 the
child could differentiate between other as an anthropomor-
phized single other and the other as a group of individuals
with whom he or she has ties, i.e., the significant others
of friends and family. This differentiation would permit a
new form of role-taking, second-order role-taking and the
corresponding level of justice structure.
Moreover, I propose that there is considerable asym-
metry among the sets of definitions used to generate each
moral dimension: that is that there is in fact some measure
of difficulty associated with each definition such that it
is easier to differentiate and articulate some dimensions
than others; thereby permitting an unequal application of
role-taking processes. The result of this difference in
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difficulty level encourages an iterative interaction between
the role-taking process and the recursive definition of each
moral dimension such that the recurrent use of second-order
role-taking for instance would foster the development of ap-
propriate discriminations for its application in the recur-
sive definition of additional dimensions.
This model of moral development utilizing the concept
of the recursive definition to define moral issue dimensions
which in turn have an effect on the utilization of role-
taking procedures is appealing on three bases: first, be-
cause it supplies an internal, system basis for development
as well as an environmental basis. I suggest that it might
offer an answer to the question, "Who was Stage 6 for So-
crates?" Second, this use of recursive definition is simi-
lar to that proposed in language development (cf. Lakoff,
1971; McCowley, 1968) and in the cognitive organization of
other domains (Goodson and Greenfield, 1975) thereby offer-
ing the attractive argument for parsimony. Third, this mod-
el makes it clear that the existence of structures consists
in their coming to be, that is they are being constructed by
a subject's constant interaction.
At the level of metaphysics which constitutes the Irnmc-
work within which theoretical psyc hological statements are
constructed, there exists the issue of whether the nature of
man is best understood or reported as basically active or
static (Heisenberg, 1958). This model's choice of the ac-
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tive category has a formative influence on how all other
subsidiary decisions are determined. Such a choice leads
directly to the basis of moral agency and a denial of the
analytic models of behaviorism and psychoanalysis. The
choice of a static model implies that once an object of
study is identified as primary, understanding should proceed
by breaking the object of study into its simplest constitu-
ent elements. Moreover, if a static model is to work, the
simple elements must be considered to be related in a unidi-
rectional and linear, causal sequence. However, no moral
worth attaches to behavior which is determined. Right ac-
tion determined is not bad or reprehensible, it simply can-
not have any moral worth.
Philosophically, the moral merit of an action must lie
in the fact that it was done for the same reason that would
be a good reason for any rational agent, in so far as he/she
is rational. Such an assumption denies causal determinants
as a basis for moral worth. The philosophical assumption of
individual as a rational agent means an agent who is capable
of representing the organization of his/her activity as
based on the logical principles of comprehensiveness, uni-
versality, and consistency.
In summary, the philosophical choice of active agents
over static objects calls for a dynamic model which is a
metatheoretical program for information processing. Such
a
model entails-- (1) the specification of the activity,
m
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this study, moral judgment; (2) a representation of the or-
ganizing forms of activity, structures; (3) an ordering of
the general forms on a dimension which changes over time
from simple to complex; and (4) an analysis of structures
in the context of the more general structures.
The effect o f personality traits on individual development
As was discussed above, the development of representa-
tional mediators and the selection of dimensions for stimu-
lus categorization is necessarily an active process. One
important feature of such an approach is that it brings the
cognitive, structural variables into closer relation to the
stimulus conditions within which social perception and judg-
ment occur.
The initial selection of dimensions on which categories
are to be formed is hypothesized in this study to be corre-
lated with other processes and characterized by age, sex,
and intra- individual differences. Since every final cogni-
tive product is a function of the dimensions initially se-
lected for processing, it is important to ascertain those
factors that may be correlated with the selection of one as-
pect of a stimulus rather than another and to discover the
existence of any unlearned links betweeen certain distal
stimuli and specific behaviors. Children with equivalent
ability and equivalent mediational structures might be at
different end states in a moral dilemma as a result of their
5 3
initial processing of stimuli.
It is therefore taken as an important primary assump-
tion of this model that trait characteristics of personality
may be correlated with the way in which individuals perceive,
organize, and interact with stimuli.
Cognitive Developmental Theory of Personality
Theory
Studies of individual differences in preferred modes of
categorization is one area where research on cognition en-
gages the work of individual differences in other domains.
Wright and Kagan (1963) point out that there is some evid-
ence that a tendency toward impulsive classifications- -clas-
sifications that are given little ref lection- - is an immedi-
ate and important antecedent of a non-analytic style. In
their words: "therefore, it becomes possible to consult the
existing theoretical and research literature on impulsivity
for fertile hypotheses about the antecedents of this re-
sponse tendency" (Wright and Kaga, 1963, p. 195). Such
studies suggest that it might be appropriate in other ef-
forts of theoretically directed research to look for rela-
tionships between personality constructs and individual cog-
nitive processes.
At present, personality traits are believed to undergo
radical transformations in development, but there is some
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basis on which to suggest that there is continuity in the
development of individuals through these transformations.
Such a conceptualization is suggested by John Dewey's state-
ment,
. . .psychology is concerned with life-careers, with
behavior as it is characterized by changes taking place in
an activity that is serial and continuous, in reference to
changes in an environment which is continuous, while chan-
ging in detail" (Dewey, 1930, p. 131).
Emmerich (1969) found that a personality factor or
cluster of behaviors at one age may be quite different from
a personality factor at a later age, but that the individual
child's location with regard to the earlier personality fac-
tor allows good longitudinal prediction with regard to his/
her location on a second later factor.
Developmental theories of personality sequence have em-
ployed some notion of a single, universal, sequence of per-
sonality stages (Freud, Erikson, Gasell). Such stage theo-
ries of personality have viewed the child's social behavior
as reflections of age-typical world views and coping mech-
anisms rather than reflections of higher character traits.
While continuity in personality development may be de-
fined in terms of a number of alternative sequences available
to different individuals in different social settings, the
fact that most personality measures of specific traits fail
to capture age-development is a result of the fact that pol-
ar traits in the personality area are seldom either age-de-
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velopmen tal or longitudinally stable. As Kohlberg defines
the term, "by polar traits are meant traits defined by a
quantitative ordering of individuals on a single dimension
(such as aggression, dependency, etc., e.g. Loevinger,
1966)" (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 371). Moreover, most develop-
mental theories of personality ".
. .assume that such
’traits’ are differential balancings of conflicting forces
and that these balancings differ at different points in the
life cycle as new developmental tasks are focused upon"
(Kohlberg, 1969, p. 371). Inherent in this theory is the
belief that certain minimal levels of specific polar traits
must be present for solution of a developmental task. But,
a further increase on a polar trait variable above the mini-
mal level is not necessarily a sign of increased develop-
ment .
In response to the traditional approach of personality
development as outlined above, it is proposed by their theo-
retical model of cognitive development that any shape or
pattern of social responses necessarily constitutes a cogni-
tive structure. Therefore, it might be most productive to
direct research on the relationship between the pattern of
social responses as they involve personality dimensions and
individual cognitive development in moral judgment.
Support for such research may be gleaned from Peck and
Havighurst's study on development (1960). This study pro-
duced striking evidence of generality in moral behavior.
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which they believed revealed a clear indication of individ-
ual character. They did find inconsistency in every sub-
ject, but they found that even individual inconsistency had
its own consistent pattern, differentiating it from that of
other individuals. Moreover, they found that consistency
was maintained throughout the process of maturation. Thus,
they concluded that character, which they defined as a com-
posite of strong emotionally- toned attitudes and motives,
formed habitual patterns of moral behavior which is fairly
stable over the first half of the life cycle.
Kohlberg himself (1969) acknowledges a strong debt to
a number of other authors whose psychological theories of
development have referred to cognitive organization as the
basis for identifying stages of personality growth. Among
those theorists is one group to which I shall make reference
also: Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder.
Research in the cognitive development of personality
Conceptual systems and personality organization
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961) suggest that an in-
dividual’s personality grows on a unidimensional develop-
mental continuum of increasing flexibility. Their basic
idea is that of concepts of conceptual systems. For Harvey
et al . "a concept in the most general sense is a schema
for
evaluating impinging stimulus objects or events" (Harvey et
al
.
,
1961, p. 10). In their model, concepts are hypothc-
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sized to be abstracted from the subject's experiences of
objects in the environment, and represents a category of
varying definitiveness on a specific dimension such as hot
or cold. In their words,
Once a concept has evolved, it serves as a psycho-
logical yardstick in terms of which stimuli are
compared and gauged, a kind of experimental filter
through which objects are screened and evaluated
on their way from sensory reception to ultimate
response evocation.
Concepts, in their matrix of interrelatedness,
serve the critical cognitive function of providing
a system of ordering by means of which the environ-
ment is broken down and organized, is differenti-
ated and integrated, into its many psychologically
relevant facets. In this capacity, they provide
the medium through which the individual establishes
and maintains his ties with the surrounding world.
It is on the basis of the web of these conceptual
ties that one is able to place onself stably and
meaningfully in relation to time, space, and other
objects and dimensions of his psychological uni-
verse (Harvey, Hunt and Schroder, 1961, pp . 10-11).
Harvey ejt al_. propose that concepts develop through a
process of differentiation and integration. As concepts un-
dergo this process of differentiation and integration they
continually attain a higher level on the dimension from con-
creteness to abstractness. Their theory focuses its atten-
tion on the levels on the dimension of concreteness -abstract-
ness at which concepts may be placed. Growth on this dimen-
sion was hypothesized to proceed through stages in which the
subject is viewed as alternately being dependent upon and
then independent of objects and events. As the subject pro-
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gresses to each successive dependent stage he/she is viewed
as more flexible and less dogmatic. With each successive
alteration from dependent to independent stage the subject
is seen as more self-directed and less negative.
According to Harvey e t a
1
.
1
s model, the process of de-
velopment is a dialectical process based on the assumption
of antithetical poles or opposites in development. This as-
sumption is based on two additional beliefs: (1) that dis-
crimination of extreme opposites can be made more easily in-
tegrated than the discrimination between less different sti-
muli; (2) that differentiation based on opposite poles are
more easily integrated than differentiations based on con-
cepts that have no necessary relationship to each other.
Harvey et_ a_l. (1961) view progression as "facilitated
under conditions of clarity of the initial concept, openness
of the developing concept to discrepant (particularly oppos-
ing) events, and the successful integration of these two
systems of mapping into new conceptual schema" (p . 86).
Their view of the process of development is one of
"emerging concepts." When conditions favor the generation
of opposing poles a new synthesis can emerge as a result of
the integration of the opposing or discrepant differentia-
tion. This new synthesis is viewed as containing modified
aspects of the two initially discrepant poles. Once the new
synthesis emerges, it in turn serves as a baseline for the
possible generation of new discrepant differentiations and
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the development of new syntheses.
Harvey et al.'s conceptualization of the opposing poles
and the steps in their discrimination is presented in Table
1* The discrimination is depicted as occurring along a sin-
gle dimension of concreteness to abstractness in four
stages. The progressive development at every stage involves
environmental conditions that induce openness of the con-
ceptual system to differentiations.
A multidimensional concept of personality development
Eiseman ( 1972 ) . Eiseman used Harvey, Hunt, and Schro-
der's model as the base which he modified for a multidimen-
sional theory of personality development. In his modifica-
tion, Eiseman took the position that "an individual's devel-
opmental status can be more accurately described as a multi-
dimensional continuum" (Eiseman, 1972, p. 2). His theory
postulates two developmental strands which are represented
by the opposing poles in Harvey et_ aj_. ' s model: a dependent
strand and an independent strand. The initial step in de-
velopment in this model is for the individual to differenti-
ate independence from dependence in its most concrete form;
this development corresponds to Stage 1 in Harvey e_t al.'s
model. However once this discrimination has been made, de-
velopment is conceptualized in the Eiseman model to occur
along each strand in a dialectical process such that differ-
entiation occurs within the developmental strands o( iiulc-
Table
1.
Stages
of
Progressive
Development
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pendence and dependence. It must be noted that where Harvey
e^t aJU emphasized the need to help a subject differentiate
a dependent pole from its preceding independent pole in or-
der to foster development. Eiseman proposed that develop-
ment could be more appropriately fostered by encouraging the
subject to discriminate between two poles within the same
strand. For example, if an individual shows signs of Pole
3 functioning (Field Dependence) Harvey et al
. would encour-
age development by focusing on the differentiation of Stage
3 from Stage 2. Eiseman would emphasize the discrimination
of Pole 3 from its ancestor, Pole 1 (absolutism).
More specifically, where Harvey et aK had one depend-
ent and one independent pole at each level of development,
Eiseman reduced the number of poles to five as indicated in
Table 2. In Harvey e_t a^L.’s model the "independent" pole of
a concept at one level (for example, Pole B) is somewhat
similar to the "independent" pole of the emergent concept at
the next level (for example, Pole C) . The same is true of
successive "dependent" poles. In Eiseman’ s model there arc
five poles in which poles 1, 3, and 5 are on the dependent
strand and poles 2, 4, and 5 are on the independent strand.
Pole 5 appears in both strands because it represents the fi-
nal stage of differentiation with the reintegration of both
strands of development.
On the basis of this theory, Eiseman constructed and
validated scales to measure a subject's development on each
Tabic 2
h2
Comparison of the Poles as Set form in Harvey, Hunt
and Schroder's Original Theory and in Eiseman's
Reformulation
Harvey et al. 's Version Eiseman's Version
Pole A Pole 1
Poles B and C Pole 2
Poles D and E Pole 3
Pole F Pole 4
Pole G Pole 5
The poles have been given the following summary labels
Pole 1: Absolutism, Glorification of Authority
Pole 2
:
Negativism, Freedom from
Pole 3: Field Dependency, Social Anxiety
Pole 4: Sel f -Absorpt ion , Freedom to
Pole 5: Active Interdependence, Collaboration
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of the poles using a machine scorable instrument. The data
from his study suggested that the five poles have consider-
able validity as isolated "personality” dimensions and, when
used in combination, as attribute predictors (Eiseman, 1972).
Moreover, the data from his study indicated that the five
pole dimensions did carry developmental significance. Pole
1 represents least development and Pole 5 represents most
development. Such development was reflected by an increase
in the extent to which individuals had a sense that they
could influence what happened to them, and an increase in
the extent to which they felt a desire to have such influ-
ence. Furthermore, the data indicated that a subject's in-
creased ability to discriminate among poles correlated with
an increase in the extent to which individuals enjoy active-
ly engaging in events that are challenging and in experi-
ences which involve intimacy. Individuals who score high on
the more advanced poles also became increasingly more will-
ing to undertake activities both on their own and in cooper-
ation with others. Scores indicating the ability to differ-
entiate Pole 5 from the other poles reflected an increased
capacity to lead and to conceptualize complexity.
A more careful examination of each of the poles may be
helpful in understanding them as isolated personality di-
mensions. Pole 1 (absolutism) is theorized to be the most
concrete pole. A person with an isolated high score on this
dimension would have a simple cognitive structure with few
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differentiations and incomplete integrative rules
. This di-
mension is correlated with fear of negative evaluation, need
achievement, social restraint and self-control. It is nega-
tively correlated with achievement via independence, auto-
nomy, complexity, non- stereotype
,
flexibility, impulse ex-
pression.
Pole 2 (Freedom From) correlates positively with auto-
nomy, evaluating independence, non- stereotype
,
flexibility,
impulse expression, social avoidance and distress. Particu-
larly they score highly on the autonomy, complexity and
flexibility scales. The explanation behind these last cor-
relations according to Eiseman,
. .
.is not that high scores on Pole 2 are autono-
mous, complex, or flexible individuals; instead it
points to an artifact in these three scales. The
items in these scales are primarily "freedom from"
items. The items which can be classified as free-
dom from conventionality, freedom from structure
. .
.
(Eiseman, 1972, p. 90).
Finally, Pole 2 individuals reject the achievement orienta-
tion which typified those high on Pole 1; they also reject
certainty and predictability and dislike engaging in routine
patterns of behavior.
Since in Eiseman’ s theory the emphasis is
ferentiation of Pole 3 (Field Dependence) from
lutism) idealized individuals who are dominant
other poles would score high on several of the
since both poles involve a form of dependency.
on the d i f
-
Pole 1 (Abso-
on one or the
same items
Thus Pole 3
6 5
correlates positively with dependency, preference for eval-
uating dependency, fear of negative evaluation, need achieve-
ment, social restraint, and self-control. Moreover, be-
cause Pole 3 individuals still depend upon the support of
the institutions with which they are identified, Pole 3 cor-
relates positively with institutionalism-humanism. However,
the subject who has differentiated Pole 3 from Pole 1 suc-
cessfully has an increased capacity to exert control over
his/her destiny.
Pole 4 (Self - absorption
,
Freedom To) is differentiated
from Pole 2 (Negativism, Freedom From) and represents an in-
creased articulation on the overall developmental dimension
of independence. Pole 4 idealized subjects would reflect a
strong inclination to develop alternative criteria of their
own by which to evaluate their actions, but they do not re-
flect earlier Pole 2 impulsivity and reject almost complete-
ly the criterion embraced by authority figures. Pole 4 sub-
jects would also score higher on an achievement dimension
and self-sufficiency scale than subjects who have not dif-
ferentiated Pole 4 from Pole 2.
Pole 5 in this theory (Interdependence) is a blend of
both Pole 3 (Field Dependence) and Pole 4 (Self-absorption);
it has elements of both developmental strands; independence
and dependence. The individual who has differentiated Pole
5 is more flexible and less dogmatic than idealized individ-
uals who are high on one of the other dimensions; he/she is
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also less dependent on the physical and social environment
and is more apt to view stressful situations as challenging
than Pole 3 subjects. Ile/she is capable of cooperating or
exercising leadership
; and would score high on measures of
achievement via independence, rationality, flexibility, au-
tonomy, and aloneness. In comparison with Pole 4 (Self-ab-
sorption) subjects, Pole 5 individuals would score lower on
the scales of withdrawal and self-sufficiency. Moreover,
Pole 5 subjects will score higher than Pole 4 subjects on
scales of increasing cognitive complexity, and measures in-
dicating increased locus of control.
The results of Eiseman’s research and its theoretical
foundation in the concepts of personality development occur-
ring through the increasing growth of cognitive complexity,
suggest that it might be appropriate to search for correla-
tions between levels of moral judgment and personality
growth
.
One important measure of the potency of any psycholo-
gical theory is the breadth of its nomothetic net. Several
theories all utilize the concepts of increasing cognitive
complexity as an indication of developmental growth. lo the
extent that these theories are correctly formulated and pro-
perly applied it is reasonable to assume that they should
reveal correlated findings. In the remainder of this sec-
tion I will compare the results of studies which utilized
each of the theories which I have discussed and attempt to
draw their findings together to show how they all consist-
ently refer to the central theme of cognitive complexity and
deve lopment
.
The most widely used approach to personality and social
behavior has involved searching out those personality traits
which aid in predicting certain types of social conduct.
Typically, the investigator carries out an initial personal-
ity assessment, and then observes the reactions of persons
with different personality attributes to a common stimulus
situation
.
I have already indicated the personality and behavior
attributes which Eiseman found to correlate with each pole
of his theory. Kohlberg makes a point that his stages of
development do not predict an individual’s answer to any
given moral dilemma, but that they reflect the way an indi-
vidual will reason out his/her answer (Kohlberg, 1969).
Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) believed that an individual's
reasoning ability in a moral dilemma might also be reflected
in his/her social behavior. Therefore, substituting Kohl-
berg’s moral judgment measure for a personality measure in
the above paradigm, they sought correlations between Kohl-
berg’s stages and social behaviors. To the extent that
Kohlberg ’ s stages were able to correlate with specific so-
cial behaviors in the Haan, Smith, and Block study which are
also predictable from Eiseman’ s model it is possible to make
a limited judgment of the two theories' relationship to each
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other
.
Ilaan, Smith, and Block (1968) conducted a study of 957
college students and Peace Corps volunteers using self-re-
ported data on the subject's political and volunteer activ-
ities, family and social background, self- and ideal-de-
scriptions, and the student's moral judgment scores indi-
cated by Kohlberg's measure. Their analysis utilized 54
percent of the responding sample, or those subjects who
could be assigned to one or another of the five "pure" moral
stage types according to their responses on the moral judg-
ment scale. From the results of their data analysis Ilaan ct
al . were able to draw personality profiles for each "pure"
stage from 2 to 6 (no subjects were found to be at Stage 1).
They concluded from their findings that the personality pro-
files are consistent with Kohlberg's conceptualization of
each stage. A review of these profiles developed by Ilaan et_
al. taken in developmental order from Stage 2 to Stage 6 are
also consistent with the behaviors that Eiseman's theory
would predict for each of the idealized individuals located
on successive developmental poles, taken in developmental
order. In making this comparison, it is appropriate to note
that Eiseman was aware of Kohlberg's material when he de-
veloped his own measure.
Eiseman indicates that Poles 2 and 4 represent separate
positions discriminated from each other on the same develop-
mental strand of independence; and that Pole 5, Interdepend-
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ence, was an amalgamation of both independent and dependent
strands. Haan et a^. indicate that the personality profiles
that they developed for each of Kohlberg's Stages 2, 5, and
6 had a number of similarities with Eiseman's concept of the
development of independence in Poles 2 and 4 and the concept
of interdependence developed in Pole 5. The profiles which
they developed for Kohlberg's Stages 3 and 4 are consistent
with Eiseman's concepts of development on the dependence
strand at Pole 3.
Haan et al. found Stage 5 and Stage 6 subjects to be
very similar, Scheffe tests were calculated for all signifi-
cant F ratios but none significantly separated Stage 5 indi-
viduals from those subjects who were described as Stage 6.
Moreover, there were a number of nonsignificant differences
which Haan et al. felt formed coherent patterns and which ap-
pear to be consistent with Eiseman's stated differences be-
tween pure Poles 4 and 5. Both Stage 5 and Stage 6 subjects
had developed an autonomous sense of self. Stage 5 subjects
saw themselves as only moderately curious, sympathetic and
responsive to others; while the Stage 6 subjects occupied
the extreme position on each dimension. Moreover the
Stage
6 subjects' ideal conceptualization of themselves included
a higher degree of personal involvement than
did the Stage
5 subjects' ideal self conceptualization.
Haan et al.'s description of Stage 2 subjects reflects
the strong Freedom From position of Eiseman's
pure Pole 2
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subjects. These subjects in the Ilaan study revealed a num-
ber of behaviors indicative of an emphasis on independence
and autonomy which was similar to the behaviors of the Stage
5 and 6 sub j ects .
Both groups [Stage 2, and Stages 5 and 6 taken as
a whole] more than any of the others, report fre-
quent interruption of their college careers, in-
dependent living arrangements, political liberal-
ism/radicalism, pro FSM [Free Speech Movement] po-
sitions, political involvement, and a lack of re-
ligious commitment. Their self and ideal descrip-
tions both express the mode of present-day "liber-
ated youth" (Ilaan et al., 1968, p. 196).
However, Haan et_ al . found distinctions between these
groups to suggest that "the two types are valid and that
their seemingly similar protesting and political behavior
arises from different sources" (Haan et al . , 1961, p. 196).
These distinctions are consistent with those predicted by
the Eiseman model. For example, the Stage 2 subjects de-
scribed themselves as most stubborn and reserved; Stages 5
and 6 as more responsive and protective. The Stage 2 sub-
jects idealized aloofness, stubbornness, and reserve; the
Stage 5 and 6 subjects idealize self-denying. The Stage 5
and 6 persons see themselves as more uncompromising than
they would like to be, but the Stage 2 individuals have lit-
tle wish to change in this regard. The two groups differ
in
their special relationship to society and authority.
The
specifically Stage 6 subjects' profiles indicated that they
were independent and critical, but also involved,
giving and
71
being responsive to others. The Stage 2 subjects’ profiles
indicated that they were independent and critical, but that
they were also angry, disjointed, uncommitted to others, and
potentially narcissistic. While the Stage 5 and Stage 6 sub-
jects were ’’characterized” as having a firm sense of self
through autonomy and a personal sense of control, Stage 2
subjects lacked any indication of these characteristics.
Moreover, the Stage 2 subjects tended to be merely joiners
of organizations while the Stage 5 and 6 subjects were ac-
tive participants.
In contrast to the strong reflection of development on
an independent dimension Haan et_ a^l.'s Stage 3 and 4 sub-
jects reflected a stronger emphasis on dependence indicative
of pure Pole 3 subjects in Eiseman’s model--Field Depend-
ency .
. .
.
[B]oth [Stages 3 and 4] share many character-
istics indicating that they conduct their lives in
expected ways: they least often interrupt their
college careers, predominantly live in institu-
tional, adult-approved arrangements, are politic-
ally more conservative (the means are in the mod-
erate to conservative range), have small political
differences with their most conservative parents,
and were least in support of the FSM (their abso-
lute means are still in the range of approving)
. .
.and they more often retain the religious be-
liefs of their childhood and still attend church
(Haan et aK
,
1968, p. 197).
From these results it is possible to conclude that
since the profiles that Haan et al. developed for each of
Kohlberg's stages bear some resemblance to the profiles
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which Eiseman developed for each of his poles that the two
developmental theories may correlate with each other in
terms of the scores on their respective measures.
Values and personality development
McLellan ( 1970 ) . McLellan conducted a study of the re-
lationship between a person's values as they are conceived
on Rokeach's value survey and individual subject's scores on
Kohlberg's measure of moral judgment. He found a correla-
tion between the values of "freedom" and "obedience" and
Kohlberg's Stage 2 and 3 respectively. Such findings are
consistent with Eiseman' s theory and the findings of Haan et_
al
.
cited above.
The psychoanalytic concept o f guilt as a measure of
moral j udgment . In the preceding chapter the psychoanalytic
concept of guilt was discussed in relation to moral develop-
ment within psychoanalytic theory. As was indicated in that
chapter expressions of guilt, such as self-criticism and
confession, as measured by projective instruments, basically
reflect socialized concerns about good or bad behaviors.
Kohlber g (1969) notes that age developmental studies indi-
cate almost no direct or conscious guilt is expressed to
stories about deviation from conventional norms for children
under eight years of age, that the majority of children aged
11 to 12 express some guilt, and that there is no change in
the amount of guilt expressed to such stories after age
12.
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Guilt as a personality trait then may not correlate highly
with moral development on the whole; however, it does corre-
late with the development of Kohlberg’s Stage 3 in terms of
age development. Conceptually the basis of guilt reactions,
transgressions of internalized ideals related to concern
about approval, seem to be related to both Kohlberg and
Eiseman's respective descriptions of the third stages of de-
velopment. Kohlberg himself suggests,
. . .if one were interested in using projective
"guilt” as an index of moral maturity, one would
simply note the qualitative presence of convention-
al guilt reactions to some transgression story as
an indication of having passed one of a number of
milestones in moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969, p.
372) .
Guilt, therefore, is one more indication of a concept,
here considered as a personality variable, which must be
discriminated and articulated during the course of develop-
ment. In particular the fear of self punishment must be
discriminated from the fear of physical punishment inflicted
by others.
The results of these studies combined with the study of
Haan et aA. and the theory proposed by Eiseman do suggest
that there may be a relationship between personality
varia-
bles and moral development. One purpose of this
study has
been to attempt to discern if a significant
correlation can
be identified between specific personality
traits and moral
development on specific dimensions.
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Pro- social Behavior
Closely related to moral development is the concept of
pro-social learning. In Staub's words,
There is an ancient and continuing human ideal
which presumes that people should help and do good
for others. This ideal is communicated to us in
many ways; in churches and schools, in family and
community life, the moral imperative to aid some
less fortunate or suffering fellows is often held
us as one of the basic human values (Staub, 1974,
p. 294).
In point of fact, the imperative to behave "pro-social-
ly" toward others is one half of Kohlberg's basic definition
of a moral dilemma, i.e. conflict between conventional rules
and human needs. The history of the psychological study of
personality characteristics and pro-social behavior is quite
lengthy. "On the whole, the attempts to demonstrate how
personal dispositions affect social behavior have not proved
very satisfactory" (Staub, 1974, p. 321).
Staub attempted to improve on previous efforts in the
study of personality and pro-social learning by developing a
new conceptual and experimental approach. First, he assumed
that several types of personality characteristics may contri-
bute to helping, and that their combination may be necessary
for certain types of helping behavior to occur. Second, he
assumed that personality traits and the nature of the sui
-
rounding conditions are likely to interact in determining
helping behavior. Finally, he asked whether certain person-
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ality characteristics would be related to certain types of
helping behaviors but not to others.
For personality measures Staub used Schwartz's (1968)
test of a person's tendency to ascribe responsibility; Ber-
kowitz and Lutterman's (1968) test of social responsibility;
Christie and Geis' test of Machiavelianism (Mach IV, Chris-
tie and Geis, 1968), a measure of a person's tendency to
manipulate others for one's advantage; a short written ver-
sion of Kohlberg's (1969) test of moral development; and
Rokeach's value survey (1969).
The results of Staub's study indicated that personality
variables and surrounding conditions jointly affected behav-
ior, "apparently resulting in greater helping behavior main-
ly by subjects with a pro-social orientation when the cir-
cumstances supported such action" (Staub, 1974, p. 327).
Staub also computed correlations between all personal-
ity measures and indices of helping behavior. The scores
representing the rank of values on the Rokeach survey as
well as the scores on each of the other personality measures
correlated significantly with measures of helping behavior.
The correlation coefficient for each of these measures with
Kohlberg's measure were, Berkowitz, .083; Schwartz, .238 (E
> .05); and Christie (on which low scores were in the pro-
social direction), -.194 (p. > .05). These results indicate
that in two instances the relationship between specific
per-
sonality measures and Kohlberg's measure was greater
than
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chance. Moreover, the make-up of the two personality scales
suggests that the relationship has a logical connection and
is not a result of statistical error. The third measure,
Berkowitz and Lutterman's test of social responsibility,
suggests itself conceptually as correlating with subjects
who would score at Stages 3 and 4 on Kohlberg's scale. A
caveat is in order in reference to the significance figures
which Staub offers: any correlation matrix will find five
percent of the correlations significant by chance. There-
fore, the amount of variance accounted for is often a more
meaningful measure. In these instances the amount of vari-
ance accounted for is very small. However, Staub referred
to Kohlberg’s scale in dichotomous terms -- sub j ects were ei-
ther Stage 5 or not Stable 5. In calculating these correla-
tions he used the Pearson Product Moment formula. It is pos-
sible -- refer ring to the theoretically proposed relationships
among the measures -- that if Kohlberg's scale had been less
attenuated the correlations might have been larger.
Gergen, Gergen, and Meter (1972) attempted to make bet-
ter predictions than had been made previously of pro-social
behavior by taking individual orientations into account.
They found that personality variables would not predict pro-
social behavior across situations; but rather that it was
necessary to take into account the varying kinds of pro-so-
cial activity, and then to search for specific
personality
predictors relevant to the payoffs in particular situations.
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The results of this study suggest to Gergen et al. that
situations in and of themselves may be grouped into a taxo-
nomy. This paradigm for a taxonomy of situations also sug-
gests itself for use with Kohlherg's dilemmas. Different
personality traits may indeed account for differential di-
mensions of a taxonomy of moral dilemmas.
Summary of the proposed view of moral development
First, cognitive functioning in humans, with regard to
moral reasoning, can be conceived of as including the selec-
tion of dimensions on which to categorize the issues in-
volved in a moral dilemma. Second, the initial selection of
dimensions on which to categorize these issues is made as a
function of age, experience, and individual personality dif-
ferences. Third, the dimensions used by individuals are
similar at early stages of development and become increas-
ingly dissimilar during development. This change occurs be-
cause of children's comparatively equally limited develop-
ment in all cognitive capacities at early ages. As age in-
creases the experiences which individual children encounter
tend to be increasingly unique. In part these experiences
vary because individual personality traits predispose an in-
dividual toward certain experiences and away from others.
The above assumptions lead to the following three pos-
tulates: first, moral reasoning involves the use of one or
more dimensions; second, the dimensions used in moral rea-
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soning vary among individuals; third, the variability among
individuals in reference to these dimensions may be partial-
ly accounted for by the variance among individuals' person-
ality trait measures.
Research Hypotheses
Basic to my position is the concept that moral reason-
ing at higher stages of development, as measured by Kohl-
berg's instrument, is a multidimensional construct. Thus:
Hypothesis 1. An initial factor analysis will reveal heavy
loadings on the first unrotated factor equal-
ling .40 thereby indicating that all issues
measure one basic construct.
Hypothesis 2. A factor analysis of moral judgment scores
will reveal more than one significant factor
underlying moral issues. That is there will
be more than one issue factor with an eigen-
value greater than 1.
These factors will be rotated to determine the best
fit. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3. The factorial structure underlying moral is-
sues are hypothesized to satisfactorily fit
an orthogonal model.
Consistent with my postulation that the dimensions on
which individuals categorize moral issues differ from
one
another among subjects is:
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Hypothesis 4. That a Q factor analysis of the subjects will
reveal more than one significant group of
subjects within each group exhibiting a simi-
lar pattern of moral reasoning scores on each
issue factor.
The theory of development as postulated above proposes
that moral judgment development on each issue factor will
correlate highly with specific personality traits. Thus:
Hypothesis 5. There will be a significant multiple correla-
tion between the scores on the designated
personality variables on the one hand and on
the scores on each moral issue dimension
taken separately.
An alternative hypothesis developed in terms of Pia-
get's theory of moral development would hold that each di-
mension of moral reasoning could be ranked on an underlying
dimension of difficulty. In this case development could be
predicted to proceed in an orderly, systematic fashion with
stage scores advancing on the easiest dimension first and
the most difficult dimensions last. As a result the follow-
ing hypothesis will be tested.
Hypothesis 6. The identified issue factors will form a
Guttman scale of difficulty showing that for
any pair of issues and given level of diffi-
culty (i.e. stage of reasoning), all subjects
will have mastered that level on one member
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CHAPTER III
METHOD AND PROCEDURE
Method
Subjects
Thirty-four female subjects voluntarily participated
in the study: six high school students from a suburban New
England high school (two juniors and four seniors)
;
twenty-
two undergraduates studying psychology in a private New En-
gland college; and six members of the support staff at a ma-
jor New England university. The ages of the sugjects ranged
from 17 to 27 years. The spread in the range of age and ed-
ucation was chosen in order to ensure as broad a range in
moral reasoning scores as possible.
I ns truments
Measure of moral judgment
Kohlberg * s test of moral reasoning . This instrument is
a collection of six moral dilemmas presented in story form
in a short paragraph. An individual dilemma is composed of
two moral issues, one issue pitted against the other. Kohl-
berg has written twenty moral dilemmas covering a total of
eight moral issues. The dilemmas in this instrument were
chosen in order to cover all eight moral issues: life,
pun-
ishment, personal contracts, conscience, authority,
civil
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rights
,
private property, and a citizen's role. Punishment
was used as one issue in three dilemmas; life and civil
rights were each used twice; and personal contract, consci-
ence, authority, private property, and a citizen's role were
each used only once. There were a total of twelve scores
for each subject.
Five of the dilemmas were developed by Kohlberg and one
was developed by the experimenter, closely following the
story lines and points at issue in Kohlberg' s dilemma twenty.
Dilemma twenty was adapted because it was viewed as age spe-
cific and would have been inappropriate for a majority of
the subjects (the six dilemmas utilized and dilemma twenty
are given in Appendix A)
.
In addition to the fact that these dilemmas covered all
eight of Kohlberg' s moral issues, they were chosen to ensure
as accurate scoring as possible. Kohlberg' s scoring guide
gave examples of appropriate responses at each moral stage
for each of these dilemmas, no comparable guide existed for
the other fourteen dilemmas.
Each dilemma was presented in paragraph form followed
by a series of probing questions designed by Kohlberg to
elicit the subject's reasoning about each of the moral is-
sues in the dilemma. In preparing this instrument the order
in which the stories were combined was systematically coun-
terbalanced to prevent the development of an order effect.
In scoring the instrument, the subjects' responses weie
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judged in reference to the examples in the scoring guide.
Each scorable response on an issue was assigned the number
of the stage it most closely resembled. If all the sub-
ject’s responses for an issue in a dilemma were at the same
stage the subject was given the number of that stage as her
score for that issue in that dilemma. If more than one
stage was used in a subject’s reasoning a mixed score was
given to the subject for that issue. The mixed score was
assigned according to Kohlberg's scoring directions. If
more than one stage was used, the stage most used was con-
sidered the major stage for that issue. In cases where two
or more stages were used the remaining stage was considered
to be the minor stage, e.g. e(4) or 3(2)--the minor stage is
enclosed in the parentheses. If the two stages were used an
equal number of times they were both considered a major
stage and written with a hypen between them, e.g. 3-4.
In order to create a scale which could be easily uti-
lized in computer analysis, all possible issue scores and
combinations (of ajoining stages only) were identified and
assigned a whole number. Since no subjects scored at Stage
1 or any combination thereof the recoding began at Stage 2,
the stage scores and their assigned equivalents arc given
in Table 3. In reference to Stage 6, Kohlbcrg stated flatly
that one should note that "Stage 6 is not included in
the
manual and should not be scored for" (Kohlberg, Scoring
Man-
ual, p. 3). As a result the subjects’ scores ranged from
a
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Table 3
Scale for Kohlberg’s Moral Stages
Kohlberg * s Stages Assigned Scale Number
2 1
2(3) 2
2-3 3
3(2) 4
3 5
3(4) 6
3-4 7
4(3) 8
4 9
4(5) 10
4-5 11
5(4) 12
5 13
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minimum of Stage 2 to a maximum of Stage 5.
Personality measures
The Social Responsibility Scale by Berkowitz and Lut-
terman (1968). The items in this scale are especially tied
into traditional values and are therefore likely to have es-
sentially a conservative individualistic theme. The scale
is also designed as a polar-opposite measure of alienation.
The eight items in this scale are written in straight-
forward Likert scale format, with five response options from
strongly agree to strongly disagree. Four items are worded
in the responsible direction, the other four are worded in
the opposite direction (the items are given in Appendix B)
.
This test was scored by reflecting the negative items
and assigning a subject a score from one to five. The sub-
ject's scores over all the items were then totalled. The
higher the subject's score, the greater the individual's so-
cial responsibility to traditional values.
Christie and Geis ' s test of Machiavcl ianism (Mach IV)
is a measure of beliefs about human nature and a tendency to
manipulate others for one's own advantage. The items deal
with views of human nature and interpesronal tactics.
The twenty items in this scale are written in a
straightforward Likert scale format, with six response op-
tions from disagree strongly to agree strongly. Ten items
were keyed as an endorsement of Machiavellian statements
and
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ten were keyed in the opposite direction (the items are
given in Appendix C)
.
The test was scored by reflecting the ten items which
were keyed in the opposite direction and assigning a sub-
ject's response a score from one to six. The subject's re-
sponses were then summed over all items. The higher the
subject's score the greater the individual's willingness to
manipulate others to her own advantage.
Schwartz ' s test of ascription of respons ib ility (AR
Scale). This test is a measure of a person's tendency to
ascribe responsibility to the self for others' welfare. It
differs from other measures which focus on the responsibil-
ity for performance of a task by focusing on the interper-
sonal consequences of acts.
The twenty-four opinion and self-descriptive items in
this measure allude to actions with interpersonal conse-
quences and provide an explicit or implicit rationale for
ascribing responsibility for those actions away from the
actor. Responses accepting the rationale are interpreted as
signs of a tendency to ascribe responsibility away from the
self. Responses that reject the rationale are taken to re-
flect a tendency to ascribe responsibility to the self.
The
items on the AR scale are scored on a four-point
continuum
from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Responses
on the
extreme for denying responsibility were scored one;
re-
sponses on the extreme for accepting responsibility
were
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scored four; twos and threes were given for moderate denials
or acceptances of responsibility. Once scored in this man-
ner the responses were summed across items to obtain an
overall AR score for each subject (the items arc given in
Appendix D)
.
The Eiseman measure of personality development
. This
instrument is a complex measure which is designed to reveal
a subject's developmental profile on five dimensions or
poles (the theoretical foundations of this instrument were
discussed in Chapter II). Scores on the five poles taken
individually are scores on five separate personality dimen-
sions: Pole 1, Absolutism, Glorification of Authority;
Pole 2, Freedom From, Negativism; Pole 3, Field Dependency,
Social Anxiety; Pole 4, Self-absorption; Pole 5, Active In-
terdependence, Collaboration. Taken together the five pole
dimensions are a single measure of development, where Pole
1 represents the least development, and Pole 5 represents
the most development.
The measure itself contains seventy-six items. Fourty-
eight are marked true or false on a five-point scale where
one equals most true and five equals most false. The re-
maining items are all in Likert format. The first twelve of
the remaining items are marked on a five-point scale from
"not at all important" to the subject to "very important."
The second set of twelve items are statements of
activities.
The respondent was asked to indicate whether she felt
that
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the activities were (1) worthless, (2) not too worthwhile,
(3) above average, (4) quite worthwhile, or (5) very worth-
while. The last set of four items were statements with
which the subjects were asked to indicate whether they
agreed or disagreed.
In order to arrive at the subjects' scores on each pole
the items were rearranged into five groups, each group of
items comprised the item inventory for one of the five poles
(the items corresponding to each pole are given in Appendix
E) . Each group of items was factor analyzed separately and
the subject's factor scores on the first unrotated factor
was the subject's score for the pole measured by that group
of items. Once the standardized factor scores on the first
unrotated factor for each group of items were determined,
they were converted to scores with a mean of one hundred and
a standard deviation of twenty. In all, every subject had
five scores, one for each pole.
The final step in scoring the data required that these
scores be converted into four separate derivative measures
reflecting a single score for each subject: a pure pole
score, a fusion score’, allypole score; and a pure pole equi-
valent score. These measures were designed to indicate the
pole to which the subject was more developmental^ open (the
procedure for arriving at each of these derivative measures
is given in Appendix F)
.
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Design
Variables
Criterion variables
. The twelve moral issue scores for
each subject were considered the dependent variables. The
four personality measures were considered the independent
measures for the purposes of the dependency analysis.
Derived variables
. The existence of these variables
was determined by the test of Hypotheses 1 through 4 using
two separate factor analyses. The first set of these vari-
ables, three moral dimensions, was the result of an R factor
analysis of the subjects' scores on each moral issue. The
second set of four variables was the result of a Q factor
analysis of the moral issue scores across subjects. In the
subsequent discriminant analysis, the subjects' scores on
each moral factor were used as criterion variables to dis-
criminate among the groups. Since the existence of these
sets of derived variables was determined as a result of
testing the first four hypotheses, discussion of their deri-
vation and character will be given in the next chapter, IV.
Procedure
All subjects were asked to respond in writing to the
six Kohlberg dilemmas, subsequently the subjects completed
the four personality measures. All subjects were permitted
to answer the test items at their own speed on their own
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time. While all subjects were asked to respond to the
Kohlberg measure first, no specific requirement was made for
the order in which the subjects answered the four personal-
ity measures.
The data were analyzed using multivariate computer pro-
grams contained in the Statistical Package for the Socia
1
Sciences version 6.0 (Nie et aj_.
,
1975). These analyses and
their results are presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Factor analysis, multiple discriminant analysis, re-
gression analysis, and scalogram analysis were used to de-
termine first whether the data supported a unidimcns iona 1 or
a multidimensional theory of moral judgment; second, whether
there was a correlation between development in moral judg-
ment and development in specific personality attributes; and
third, if more than one dimension was found, whether it was
likely for a subject to be rated at the same stage across
the several dimensions. The data analysis and results will
be presented below in the order of the hypotheses.
Analysis of moral issue scores : Hypotheses One to Four
Factor Analysis, an overview
In planning to utilize factor analytic techniques, ty-
pically the experimenter will have gathered measurements on
n variables over N persons. Wishing to know "what does with
what" among these variables, the experimenter will intercor-
relate the n variables, as they vary over the N subjects.
He/she must do this for all possible N(n-l)/2 pairings of
variables, thus producing a square symmetrical correlation
matrix. The process of factor analysis is designed to re-
solve this correlation matrix into an n x k factor matrix,
where the number of factors, k, is usually much smaller than
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n, the number of variables. These factors may be regarded
as underlying influences or dimensions which, in further
analysis, can be substituted for the more numerous variables
and which largely account for the correlations among the
latter.
The term factor analysis is not a unitary concept, and
it subsumes a fairly large variety of procedures; the most
general classification may be organized around the major al-
ternatives at each of the three steps of factor analysis.
The three usual steps arc (1) the preparation of the corre-
lation matrix, (2) the extraction of the initial factors,
and (3) the rotation to a terminal solution. The major op-
tions at each stage may be summed up by three dichotomies:
R-type versus Q-type factor analysis in Step 1; defined ver-
sus inferred factors in Step 2; and orthogonal versus ob-
lique rotation in Step 3. Each choice made in the analysis
of the present data will be indicated as we proceed with the
discussion of the data analysis and results.
Hypotheses One and Two
R factor analysis . A correlation matrix was calculated
between each pair of moral issues across all 34 subjects. A
factor analysis was applied to this correlation matr ix of
moral issue variables. The factoring of a matrix such as
this in which the variables (columns) are the characteris-
tics, and the entities (rows) are subjects is termed R iac-
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tor analysis
.
In regard to the initial data matrix, factor analysis
makes no assumption of normality, but it is a fact that sim-
ple factor structure is clearer when scores are normally
distributed than when they are unevenly distributed or when
the range of the sample population is so large that it en-
compasses essentially different types of subjects. Since
subjects and moral issues were chosen so as to achieve as
broad a range as possible it was determined that a prelimin-
ary examination of the data matrix for a normal distribution
would be appropriate.
Three tests for independence were applied to the ini-
tial data matrix: Bartlett’s test of sphericity; inspection
of the off-diagonal elements of the anti-image covariance
matrix; and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling ade-
quacy. The Bartlett test is a measure of the extent to
which the sample correlation matrix comes from a multivari-
ate normal population in which the variables of interest are
independent. Rejection of the hypothesis is taken as an in-
dication that the data are appropriate for analysis. The
hypothesis that the variables of interest in this study were
independent was rejected at the p < .001 level.
Because Bartlett’s test is approximately distributed as
a chi-square distribution, the sample size has a substantial
effect on the probability of rejection. Consequently the
inspection of the off-diagonal elements of the anti-image
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covariance matrix may also aid in judging the psychometric
quality of the correlation matrix. The test is a measure of
the number of the non-zero off-diagonal elements. Twenty-
one point two percent of the off-diagonal elements in this
matrix were found to be greater than .09. Since the percent
of non-zero, off-diagonal elements was found to be less than
the cutoff point of 251, the matrix was judged to be appro-
priate for analysis.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy al-
lows an experimenter to make decisions regarding both indi-
vidual variables and the overall quality of the correlation
matrix. A score of less than .50 is considered unsatisfac-
tory. The correlation matrix in this analysis received a
score of .80 which is described by Kaiser (1974) as "meri-
torious .
"
As the second step in this analysis the factors were
extracted using a principle- factor solution in which common-
alities were placed in the diagonal of the correlation ma-
trix. The factor matrix and the initial loadings are given
in Table 1. In placing commonalities in the diagonal, it is
assumed that all the influences which affect the variables
under study are substantially but not completely represented
in the small set of sample variables. Because some of the
variables are assumed to be left out, some of the variance
is assumed to be unaccounted for and it is recognized
that
correlation of any variable with itself may fall short
of
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unity. This unaccounted-for variance would surface only if
all the variables were included in the correlation matrix.
Factors derived from this method are termed "inferred”
because there is no mathematical proof that the factors
would not change if all the variables were present. The as-
sumption is made, however, that the part of a variable that
is influenced by the additional unidentified variables does
not contribute to the relationships among the variables
present. The alternative method of analysis would be to as-
sume that all the variables are present and that all the
variance is accounted for. Since Kohlberg does not claim to
have identified all the issues which might contribute to a
moral dilemma, the principle-component method of factoring
which could have given a definitive set of factors was con-
sidered inappropriate.
The analysis revealed one initial factor and two lesser
factors. The first factor had an eigenvalue of 5.699 and
accounted for 73.5 percent of the total variance in the
data; the second factor had an eigenvalue of 1.287 and ac-
counted for 16.6 percent of the variance, while the remain-
ing factor had an eigenvalue of .769 and accounted for 9.9
percent of the variance.
An example of Table 4 indicates that each of the moral
issue measures loaded on the first unrotated issue factor
with a correlation above .53.
Table 4
R Factor Analysis: Unrotated Matrix
Factor Eigenvalue Pet
. of Var
.
Cum.
1 5.69952 73.5 73
2 1 .28726 16.6 90
3
. 76954 9.9 100
R Factor Analysis
Factor Matrix Using Principal Factor with Iterations
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1 . 73007
.
26217 .33318
2
. 53924 -
. 01290 .60335
3 . 77741 .23038 .07949
4 .66815 .27747 - .03288
5 .61640 - .12369 - .03426
6 .61029 . 14852 - .19041
7 . 74301 - .42218 . 20414
8 . 72562 - .27448 - .60615
9 . 78809 - . 50544 - . 31449
10 .63127 - . 40722 - . 06129
11 .65366 .42292 - .10808
12 . 73967 .44407 - . 30005
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Hypothesis one. An initial factor analysis will
reveal heavy loadings on the first unrotatcd
factor, equalling or exceeding
.40, thereby
indicating that all issues measure one basic
construct
.
(Hypothesis accepted.)
Hypothesis two
.
ment scores
factor with
(Hypothesis
A factor analysis of moral judg-
will reveal more than one issue
an eigenvalue greater than 1.
accepted
.
)
Hypothesis Three
The third step in the analysis was to rate the factor
matrix to obtain simple and theoretically meaningful fac-
tors. The effect of rotation is to locate the factor axes
so that the variables load as cleanly on one single factor
as possible. That is, that a variable correlates highly
with one factor and close to zero with the others . The fac-
tor structure was rotated using two separate solutions; an
orthogonal solution, vermax and an oblique solution, oblim.
The rotated factor pattern matrices are printed in Table 5.
As can be seen from examination of the tables, three factors
emerged as a result of the rotated solutions. The oblique
or correlated solution produced the factors which maximized
the variable loadings on a single factor and reduced them
most substantially on the remaining factors. However, the
nature of each factor is basically unchanged in either ma-
trix.
The matrix of the oblique factor pattern correlations,
Table 6, illustrates the degree to which each
factor is cor-
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Table 5
Rotated Factor Pattern Matrices
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix
after Rotation with Kaiser Normalization
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1 .55107 .19826
. 50808
2 .15101 .21549
.
76533
3 .64311
.
31032
. 39226
4
. 64946
. 23178
.
24873
5 .33382 .49305 .20469
6 .56503
.
32558 .07422
7 .13757 .73792 .45664
8
. 312 03 .67944 . 21558
9 .27926 .94733 - .00598
10 .16019 .71662 .16994
11 .75292 .13322 .1 8214
12
. 88631 .21702 .04114
after
Oblique Factor
Rotation with
Pattern Matrix
Kaiser Normalization
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1 . 50870 .00640 . 52095
2 .02397 - .10324 .75567
3 .60750 - .12758 .25420
4 .64246 - .0571 3 .11489
5 . 21947 - .45118 . 07485
6 . 54965 - .21052 -.07555
7 - .10648 - .75529 . 33574
8 .13948 - .67197 .05760
9 .05001 -1.02219 - .22102
10 - . 04119 - . 76354 . 02850
11 . 80945 .07962 . 04121
12 .95549 . 00018 - .14762
99
Table 6
Factor Pattern Correlations
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1 1.00000 -
. 51774 .35537
2 -
. 51774 1 . 00000 -
. 36701
3 .35537 -
. 36701 1.00000
ion
® 1 t ® d with the others
. Factor two is negatively corre-
lated with factor one (r =
-.51); the magnitude of this cor-
relation indicates that approximately 25 percent of the va-
riance in the one factor is accounted for by the other.
Factor 3 is mildly correlated with either of the other two
factors (r = .35 with Factor 1 and r = .36 with Factor 2).
In both cases the correlation of Factor 3 with either one of
the other two factors accounts for less than 13 percent of
the variance.
Hypothesis three . The factorial structure under-
lying the moral issues are hypothesized to fit
an orthogonal model.
(The hypothesis was rejected.)
In factor analysis the variance in a variable accounted
for by a specific factor is the square of the factor loading
for the variable. These factor loadings can be used to
"name” the factors by identifying the dominant variables
they measure. An examination of the oblique factor pattern
matrix reveals the nature of each of the factors derived in
this study.
Factor one loads most heavily on Variables 3, 4, 6, 11,
and 12. These are the issues of life in Dilemma IV, punish-
ment in Dilemma IV, conscience in Dilemma VI, and the issues
of citizen role and punishment in Dilemma VIII. These is-
sues all refer to an evaluation of an individual's
responsi-
bility to his/her social roles. Variable 3 refers to saving
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a life, and Variable 4 to punishment for transgressing such
a social role. Variable 6 refers to the individual’s com-
mitment to internalized social role norms. Variables 11 and
12 refer to an individual's responsibility to society for
transgressing a norm (as in Variable 4) and also to his/her
responsibility toward other individuals.
Factor two loads most heavily on Variables 7, 8, 9, and
10 (it was suggested by the computer program consultants
that the fact that Variable 9 is indicating a loading great-
er than 1 on this factor is the result of rounding error)
.
These arc the issues of authority, civil rights and personal
property, and refer to rights and responsibilities which are
interpreted and enforced on legal grounds. Variable 7 re-
fers to the authority of the courts, Variables 8 and 9 refer
to civil rights, and Variable 10 refers to the concept of
possession and allocation of real property vis-a-vis the
rights of others.
Factor 3 loads on Variable 2, punishment in the Heinz
story. The discrimination of punishment in this factor from
the other punishment variables is explained in terms of the
nature of the act for which the punishment is prescribed.
In the other cases punishment was prescribed for the viola-
tion of at least nominally accepted social norms. In
Vari-
able 2 the punishment is in effect for a pro-social
act-at-
tempting to save a life. The issue here is the
appropriate-
ness of punishment. In assigning moral blame
it is as ne-
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cessary to judge the act as well as the actor. In law it
is referred to as mens rea, the state of mind, i.e. the in-
dividual’s intent. The law considers the question in the
negative form; "an individual is not liable to be punished
if at the time of what he was doing what would be a punish-
able act he was among other things subjected to gross forms
of coercion" (Kipnis, 1975, p. 2). In the Heinz dilemma,
the wife’s condition is one of coercion. This factor was
termed punishment in reference to the judgment of the appro-
priateness of punishment on the basis of moral guilt.
Hypothesis Four
Q factor analys is . The subjects were divided into
three groups of eleven subjects each; one subject was de-
leted at randon. A correlation matrix was calculated be-
tween each pair of subjects' scores across moral issues for
each of the three groups of subjects. Three correlation ma-
trices in all were calculated. The factoring of such a ma-
trix--in which the entities (subjects) are the columns, and
the variables (moral issues) are the rows--is termed Q-
analysis
.
All three matrices were found to be factorable accord-
ing to the inspection of the off-diagonal elements of the
anti-image covariance matrix. Bartlett's test indicated
that assumptions of independence could be rejected at the
p < .05 level for only the first matrix (p
< .02); tests on
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the other two matrices indicated that assumptions of inde-
pendence could be rejected only at p < .08 and p < .08 re-
spectively. The Kaiser -Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling ade-
quacy was unsatisfactory for all three groups. In spite of
the negative results of two of the measures of factorabil-
ity, it was decided to proceed with the analysis on the ba-
sis of the inspection of the off-diagonal elements of the
anti-image covariance matrix; this decision was made princi-
pally because this test was the only one of the three which
was independent of sample size and therefore not suspect due
to the small N in each group.
The three data matrices were factored using the same
principle - factor procedures as were used in the R factor
analysis. It was necessary to divide the subjects into
three groups to meet the mathematical requirements of factor
analysis. The requirements are the result of the following
mathematical relationships: (1) the rank of the data matrix
is equal to the smaller side of the original data matrix,
and (2) the rank of the matrix is in general equal to the
number of factors that can be delineated. In other words,
in this instance no more factors could be extracted than the
number of individuals in each group. Since the analysis was
to factor subjects into as many or as few groups as possi-
ble, a matrix which was limited in the number of variable
factors which it could produce by the number of entities
in
the original data matrix would have been inappropriate.
If
1 04
all the subjects had been placed in one group no more fac-
tors could have been derived than there were moral issues
because such an analysis would have formed a 12 x 34 matrix
and the 12 moral issues would have formed the shortest side
of the matrix. By dividing the subjects into three groups,
three matrices were formed, each 12 x 11; the eleven sub-
jects from the shortest side.
Dividing the subjects into three groups had the addi-
tional advantage of enabling the experimenter to determine
if the groups identified were indeed stable. The stability
of the groups will be discussed in terms of the results of
the multiple discriminant analysis.
The Q factor analysis revealed four initial factors in
each group of eleven subjects on the basis of the inner cor-
relations exhibited in each of the data matrices. The ini-
tial factor matrices and the oblique factor pattern matrices
for each group are given in Tables 7, 8, and 9. An oblique
rotation of the factor structure indicated four correlated
factors in each group. It is important to note that the
common factors in one analysis cannot possibly be identical
with those from another analysis because they are based on
a different set of variables in each analysis (people in Q
analysis). It is possible, however, that the factors from
the different analyses do overlap (Cattell, 1965). In order
to determine whether the factors overlapped sufficiently for
the groups of subjects to be considered similar, each sub-
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Table 7
Comparison of Initial and Rotated Factor
Pattern Matrices for Group 1
Q Factor Analysis
Q Factoring of Eleven Subjects
Factor Matrix Using Principal Factor with Iterations
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
1 -
. 29005 -
. 30873 '. 5 4 8 8 3~ .43976
4 -
.47925 .52179 - .05306
. 33981
7 .65735 - .48648 -
. 10705 .40807
10 -
. 39342
. 24462 -
. 31002 .01222
13
. 13265 - .95541
. 00356 - .02748
16 .69627
. 16199 .40596 .12225
19 .32677 .35468 .23504 - .06254
22 .68266 - .03534 - .69981 .22038
25 .94844 .27340 .04961 - .15942
28 - .13572 .21858 - . 08580 .72100
31 .82755
. 32482 .17069 .07799
Factor Eigenvalue Pet . of Var
.
Cum. Pet.
1 3.57867 45.9 45.9
2 1 .95733 25.1 71 .
1
3 1 . 16035 14.9 85 .
9
4 1.09504 14.1 100 .
0
Oblique Factor Pattern Matrix
after Rotation with Kaiser Normalization
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
1 - .07122 - .23898 . 73240 .03102
4 - . 11995 .54502 .08122 .47481
7 .21613 - .81874 - .18365 .27101
10 - . 34810 .33998 - .18811 .12771
13 - . 34100 - . 88780 .12084 - . 2 3973
16 .81589 - .13134 .11800 .06103
19 . 52914 .22380 .02881 - .03387
22 . 09555 - .42777 - . 84902 . 26536
2 5 .83281 - .08114 - . 38388 -.15322
2 8 - . 00795 .02471 .04153 . 76530
31 .85024 - .04721 - .18163 .07619
Factor Pattern Correlations
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
1 T700000
-
-.14850 - .1 82 72“ - .04 809
2 - .14850 1 .00000 . 00696 .09166
3 - .18272 .00696 1.00000 . 00307
4 - . 04809 .09165 . 00307 1.00000
Tabic 8
Comparison of Initial and Rotated Factor
Pattern Matrices for Group 2
Q Factor Analysis
Q Factoring of Eleven Subjects
Factor Matrix Using Principal Factor with Iterations
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
2
. 39485 .18070
. 70667 .57642
5 -
. 12191 - .16299 . 76464 .46981
8 .55405 .20174
. 50616 .01089
11 - .23255 -.34593
. 26723 - .03179
14
. 79039 -.02894 . 30827 - .00908
17 .70543 .47426 .10199 - .50890
20 .75319 - .23983 . 20510 - .09589
23 . 13632 .91149 . 31352 .20888
26 . 36643 - .75234 . 34256 .32239
29 - .14431 .69170 - .04378 .43182
32 .63382 - . 25755 - .20146 . 26877
Factor Eigenvalue Pet. of Var
.
Cum. Pet.
1 2 . 79686 33 .
7
33.7
2 2.44447 29 .
5
63.2
3 1 . 81732 21.9 85 . 2
4 1 . 22863 14 .
8
100.0
Oblique Factor Pattern Matrix
after Rotation with Kaiser Normalization
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
2 - .04523“ . 20172 - .11485 . 99827
5 - .10528 .26689 . 86617 - .18187
8 .60236 .38893 .23060 - .12451
11 - .23918 - .41969 - .04311 .06447
14 .64709 - .05132 - .19517 .45067
17 .83153 . 31277 - .49273 - . 19531
20 .78031 - .11447 .14785 . 04958
23 .05957 .98982 - . 03446 .00862
26 . 33041 - . 39261 .73689 .13383
29 -.35145 . 74807 - . 00706 . 30052
3 2 .45572 - . 12407 .15881 .55155
Factor Pattern Correlations
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor
4
l 1 .00000 .02484 .09675 .11403
2 .02484 1 . 00000 - .08776
- .11217
%
.
09675 - .08776 1.00000 - .08107
4 .11403 - .11217 - .08107 1.00000
Table 9
Comparison of Initial and Rotated Factor
Pattern Matrices for Group 3
Q Factor Analysis
Q Factoring of Eleven Subjects
Factor Matrix Using Principal Factor with Iterations
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
3 .84476 .12327 - .08283 - .11592
6 - . 31264 .06366 . 32887 .25080
9 . 79486 - .18141
. 38738 .16056
12 - .10975
. 31020 - .30271 .79293
13 .68420 .36366 - .52911 - .10924
18 - .43855 .75564 - .18236 - .00588
21 . 29994 .70172 .43148 .05503
24 .06139 .41004 .42192 .22078
27 .40041 .23641 - .44995 .11346
30 - . 34093 .72749 .05561 - .44223
33 .44855 .21021 .35114 - . 04095
Factor Eigenvalue Pet
.
of Var . Cum . Pc t
.
2 .68715 37.3 3 7.3
2 2 .14149 29 .
8
67.1
3 1 . 36297 18.9 86.0
4 1.00471 14 .
0
100.0
Oblique Factor Pattern Matrix
after Rotation with Kaiser Normalization
Variable
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
Factor Pattern
Factor
1
2
3
4
Factor 1 Factor 2
.
36101 - .23012
.17053 . 00733
. 56543 - .66397
.
00707 - . 0412 5
.08923 .11122
.06041 .81395
.
81675 .27630
.57820 .08938
-
.
00178 .02417
.19841 .91256
.55714 - . 10117
Correlations
Factor 1 Factor
1 .00000 T7imTr
.02119 1 .00000
- .11179 .15099
.01686 . 20125
Factor 3 Factor 4
- .65524“ - .13358
.46409 .17674
-
.
14688 - .07604
- .08881 .91920
- .94107 .07511
-
.
06891 .24664
- .07222 .03749
.18750 .15815
- .62528 . 26039
- .03336 - .25504
- .10173 - .14375
Factor 3 Factor 4
-
.
11179 .01686
.15099 .20125
1.00000 .07419
.07419 1.00000
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ject was assigned a number on the basis of her factor load-
ing in one of the three groups. This assignment process
created four groups. To determine if the subjects assigned
to each group did indeed belong together, a multiple discrim-
inant analysis procedure was utilized.
Multiple discriminant analys i
s
. A multivariate tech-
nique, discriminant analysis, is designed to distinguish be-
tween two or more groups of cases. The groups are defined
by the particular research situation. In order to distin-
guish among the groups the researcher selects a collection
of discriminating variables that measure characteristics on
which the groups are expected to differ.
Discriminant analysis attempts to distinguish the
groups by forming one or more linear combinations of the dis-
criminating variables. The combinations of discriminating
variables are referred to as "discriminant functions" and
are of the form
Di = d il Z l + d i 2 Z 2
+
* • •
+ d ip z p
where Di is the score for each cas e on the discriminant
function i
,
the d ' s a re weighting coefficients, and the Z's
are t h e stan dar d i z e d values of the p discriminating v a r i a
-
bles used in the analysis. Ideally, the discriminant scores
(D’s) for the cases within a particular group will be fairly
similar, thereby causing each of the cases, within the pievi-
ously hypothesized group, to be located closely together on
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discriminant function. Once the discriminant functions have
been defined, the experimenter is able to pursue two re-
search objectives: analysis and classification.
The analysis aspect of this technique gives the re-
searcher information in the form of statistical tests which
measure the success with which the discriminating variables
actually discriminate when combined into the discriminant
functions. Since the discriminant functions can be thought
of as the axes of a reduced geometric space, they can be
used to study the spatial relationships among the groups.
Such an analysis will determine whether the cases assigned
to each group overlap among groups. The weighting coeffici-
ents (d’s) can be interpreted much as in factor analysis,
i.e. they can be used to identify the variables which con-
tribute most to the discriminant function, thereby enabling
the experimenter to label the function.
The use of discriminant analysis as a classification
technique comes after the initial compilation. Once a set
of variables is found which provides satisfactory discrimin-
ation for cases with known group memberships, a set of clas-
sification functions can be derived which will permit the
classification of new cases with unknown memberships. Or,
as was done in this study, the original set of cases can be
reclassified using the discriminating functions. The proce-
dure for classification involves the use of a separate line-
ar combination of the discriminating variables for each
group. The classification procedure produces a probability
of group membership for each case; the cases are then as-
signed to the group in which they have the highest probabil-
ity of belonging.
In this study the three moral factors were used as the
discriminant variables to determine whether the subjects
within each group exhibited a similar pattern of moral rea-
soning. The means and standard deviations of each group’s
scores on each of the moral factors is given in Table 10.
Three discriminant functions were derived from these vari-
ables.
There are three statistical indications of the adequacy
of the discriminant functions for discriminating among
groups: the eigenvalue associated with a function, the ca-
nonical correlation; and Wilk’s lambda. Each of these sta-
tistics will be explained in turn and related to the dis-
criminant functions identified in this study. Each discrim-
inant function, with its standardized coefficients, eigen-
values, canonical correlation, and Wilk's lambda is given
in Table 11.
The eigenvalue is computed in the process of deriving
the discriminant function; there is one eigenvalue for each
discriminant function and the sum of the eigenvalues is a
measure of the total variance existing in the discriminating
variables. The eigenvalue can be used to compute the rela-
tive importance of each discriminant function by expressing
Means
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Table 11
Discriminant Analysis of Four Q Factor Groups
Eigenvalue Canonical Correlation
53228
.58939
11548
. 32176
03504 .18399
Number
Functions
Removed
Wilks
Lambda Chi - Square D.F. Signi f icancc
0
.
56525 16.82925 9 .051
1
. 86612 4.23994 4 .375
2 .96615 1.01597 1 . 313
Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients
1 2 3
Social Role
Legal
Punishment
.95912
- .91225
. 21685
.28322
-
. 00959
- .98271
. 54803
.65824
.12522
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each individual eigenvalue as a percentage of the total sum
of the eigenvalues.
The sum of the eigenvalues for all three of the dis-
criminant functions in this analysis is .70. The eigenvalue
of the first dimension is .57, which indicates that the
first discriminant function accounts for 78.4% of the total
variance accounted for by all the functions. The eigenvalue
of .12 for the second function indicates that it accounts
for 16.7% of the total variance. The third function ac-
counts for 5% of the variance with an eigenvalue of .19.
Clearly the first function is the most important, the second
considerably less important and the third function not very
important at all.
The canonical correlation is a measure of correlation
between an individual discriminant function and an individ-
ual's group assignment as it were. As such it is a second
measure of a discriminant function's ability to discriminate
among groups. The canonical correlation squared may be in-
terpreted as the proportion of variance in the discriminant
function that is attributable to the groups.
The squares of the canonical correlations associated
with each of the discriminant functions in this analysis in-
dicate that groups accounted for 36% of the variance in the
first function, 4% of the variance in the second function
and 2% of the variance in the third function. Again the
first function is the best discriminator.
The third statistic, Wilk’s lambda, is an inverse mea-
sure of the discriminating power of the original variables
which has not yet been accounted for by the discriminant
functions. The larger lambda is, the less information is
present in the discriminating variables. Lambda can he
transformed into a chi-square statistic for a readily dis-
cernible test of statistical significance.
In this study before any functions were removed, lambda
was .56 with an associated chi-square test of statistical
significance of p < .05. This chi-square indicates that
considerable discriminating power exists in the variables
being used. After some of the discriminating power has been
removed by placing it into the first discriminant function,
lambda increases to .86. The chi-square value of p < .37
indicates that there is little discriminating power left.
After the removal of the information used by the second
function, lambda increases to .96 with an associated chi-
square of p < .31.
The final measure of the value of the two discriminant
functions is their ability to identify the group membership
of a case when the only known information is the case s val
ues on the discriminating variables. This facet of discrim-
inant analysis was used to reclassify each case into its ns
signed group in terms of the Q factor analysis. Fifty-five
point nine percent of the known cases were correctly classi-
fied. This power of discrimination was equal to a chi-
115
square value with p < .001.
The discriminant functions can be identified and label-
led by referring to the standardized discriminant function
coefficients. These coefficients represent the relative
contribution of an associated variable to each function.
The groups can be labelled in terms of their position on
each function. The sign of the discriminant function coef-
ficients denote whether the variable is making a positive or
negative contribution.
Function one is composed of a high loading, .95, by the
social role factor, and a high negative loading of legal
factor, -.91. The second function is clearly composed of
the punishment factor, -.98. A group profile can be identi-
fied in terms of each group’s position on the first two dis-
criminant functions. The third discriminant function lias
been ignored because it supplies so little information.
Each of the individuals in each group is illustrated in ref-
erence to their position on each discriminant function in
Figures 1 to 4; each individual’s discriminant score on each
function is given in Appendix E.
An examination of Figures 1 through 4 reveals the dis-
persion of scores about the group centroid (the "mean posi-
tion" of the group). The axes in the figure are the first
and second discriminant functions measured in standard units
An examination of these figures reveals the degree of cohe-
sion within the four groups.
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Figure 5 is a plot of the four group centroids in com-
parison to each other and the two discriminant functions.
Group 1 is principally located in the lower left hand
quadrant of Figure 1. It is a relatively cohesive group
which is extended along the horizontal axis, the first dis-
criminant function. It is extended to a lesser degree along
the bottom (negative) half of the second function. The pro-
file of this group indicates that the subjects have higher
scores on the legal and punishment issue factors than they
have on the social role factor.
Group 2 is a cohesive group principally located about
the origin of both axes. A rotation of the axes indicates
that Group 2 is slightly dispersed along the axes of the
first discriminant function. The profile of this group re-
veals that it is composed of subjects with similar scores on
both dimensions; therefore they will have relatively similar
scores on all three issue factors. A comparison of Figures
1 and 2 reveals that there is overlap between the two groups.
Group 3 is not a cohesive group. Tt is characterized
principally by its position on the first discriminant i unc-
tion; it is quite dispersed along the ordinate axes or the
second discriminant function. Figure 3 reveals that there
are really two groups within Group 3, one located high and
one low on the second axes with the centroid of the
two
groups located close to the origin. Group 3 contains
one
outlying member which is high on the first discriminant
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function. The effect of this outlyer is to move the group
centroid toward the origin on the horizontal axes. The pro-
file of the Group 3 is blurred. The subjects would tend to
have higher scores on the legal factor than on the social
role factor, while their scores on the punishment factor
would vary.
Group 4 is the smallest group; it is a group with high-
er scores on the social role issues than on the legal issues
factor. The subjects also have high scores on the punish-
ment issue factor. The group contains one outlying member
which is inconsistent with the group position on the second
discriminant function. The profile for Group 4 would show
that the subjects were scoring higher on the social issues
than legal issues, and higher on the punishment issue than
the 1 egal issues
.
From the visual displays of the group centroids and the
positions of the individual group members in reduced geome-
tric space it is possible to visualize what the statistics
associated with each discriminant function are saying. The
first discriminant function defines the groups most clearly.
The second function does help in defining the groups but
only to a much lesser degree--it is no help, for example, in
defining Group 3. From these figures it is possible to con-
clude that a Q factor analysis of the subjects revealed
more
than one group of subjects with subjects within each group
exhibiting a similar pattern of moral reasoning scores
on
12 3
each issue factor,
the two factors cou
.
001-
- see Table 12)
and a small number
However, it should
Id differentiate be
there is some over
of outlying scores
he noted
tween the
lap among
in two of
that while
groups (p <
the groups
,
the groups.
Hypothesis four
. A Qjects wTll reveal
group of subjects
group exhibiting
reasoning scores
(Hypothesis four
factor analysis of the sub-
more than one significant
,
with subjects within each
a similar pattern of moral
on each issue factor,
was accepted.)
Correlation of personality variables with mora 1 issue fac -
tors
Hypothesis Five
Multiple linear regression . A stepwise multiple linear
regression analysis of the subjects’ personality scores on
each moral issue factor indicated no significant linear de-
pendence between the personality variables and the moral is-
sue factors
.
Hypothesis five. There will be a significant mul
—
tiple correlation between the scores on the
designated personality variables on the one
hand and on the scores on each moral issue di-
mension taken separately.
(Hypothesis five was rejected.)
D ifficulty level among moral issue factors
Hypothesis Six
Scalogram analysis . This type of item analys
monly termed Guttman scaling after its originator,
is
,
com-
was used
Tabic 12
Percent of Known Cases Correctly Classified
by Discriminant Analysis
Number Predicted Group Membership
Group of Cases Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
1 10 6 1 3 0
60.0% 10.0% 30.0% 0.0%
2 10 1 4 2 3
10.0% 40.0% 20.0% 30.0%
3 9 3 0 5 1
33.3% 0.0% 5 5.6% 11.1%
4 4 0 0 1 3
0.0% 0.0% 2 5.0% 7 5.0%
54.5 percent of known cases correctly classified.
Chi-Square = 15.364 Significance = .000
to determine if the three factors identified by the R factor
analysis could be ordered into a cumulative scale that is a
scale where the component factors could be ordered by their
respective degrees of difficulty such that respondent who
replies positively to a difficult item would always respond
positively to a less difficult item.
In order to create a Guttman scale, the scores on indi-
vidual items must be dichotomized, such that a subject is
classified as either passing or failing that item; respond-
ents who score on a scale equal to or above a selected cut-
ting point are considered to have passed an item; those sub-
jects who have scores below the cutting point are considered
to have failed the item.
The data entered into this analysis were the subjects'
standardized factor scores on each moral issue factor (con-
verted so that the distribution of scores on each factor had
a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 20)
.
Three separ-
ate cut-off points were tried across the three moral issue
factors: one standard deviation below the mean, the mean,
and one standard deviation above the mean. These three
points resulted in nine possible scales being developed.
The results from the development of the nine separate
scales revealed that it was not possible to develop a reli-
able unidimensional and cumulative scale of difficulty.
The
coefficients of reproductibility and scalability were
all
well below the acceptable minimum. It should be
noted that
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the use of normalized factor scores in their analysis may
have increased the chances of type II error.
Hypothes i s six . The identified issue factors will
form a Guttman scale of difficulty showing that
for any pair of issues and given level of dif-
ficulty (i.e. state of reasoning), all subjects
will have mastered that level on one member of
the pair when they have done so on the other.
(Hypothesis six was rejected.)
The implications of the results of all six hypotheses
for a theory of moral development will be discussed in the
following chapter along with suggestions for further re-
search .
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
Discus s ion
The Findings
The results of this study indicate that there are at
least two issue dimensions on which subjects differentiated
the moral issues presented to them: dimensions which I have
labelled social role and legal issues. It is probable that
there is also a third dimension, which I have labelled pun-
ishment. The existence of this third dimension is uncertain
because only one issue clearly loaded on it. Moreover, the
eigenvalue associated with this factor indicates that it ac-
counts for a very small proportion of the total variance.
Nevertheless, the existence of the third dimension does make
sense in terms of a logical analysis of issue three and its
relationship to the other issues.
In issue three the question is whether or not Heinz
should be punished for attempting to save his wife's life.
In this instance it is a question of punishing a person for
carrying out a pro-social act. In the other stories where
punishment is an issue, it is a question of punishment for
anti-social behavior: killing someone in the case of
euthen
asia or Valjean's returning to jail for a crime which he did
commit. The point is that the basic nature of
the initial
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act is different. The distinction is a fine one and factor
analysis cannot indicate which subjects or how many subjects
made the distinction, an important question for future re-
search .
Therefore, I suggest that further research be conducted
in which additional instances of this issue are utilized.
Story VIII, which was used to develop issue eleven, the ci-
tizen's role, and issue twelve, punishment, is really an
adaptation of Victor Hugo's Les Miserables . The basic theme
in that novel is about punishment for pro-social acts. Val-
jean was originally imprisoned for stealing food for his
starving family. Story VIII could be written to include as-
pects of the original story line as it was conceived by Hugo
to make the pro- social/punishment issue salient.
The Q factor analysis revealed that the subjects did
indeed cluster into groups in terms of their individual de-
velopment on each issue dimension. This fact suggests that
there is an underlying basis for the development of individ-
uals in terms of their growth on each dimension. It was
originally hypothesized in this study that the underlying
basis for such development would be related to an individ-
ual's personality development. I originally believed that
an individual's development in terms of his/her ability to
discriminate on specific issue dimensions would occur in
part because an individual's personality traits predisposed
him or her toward certain experiences that would cause the
development of a specific issue dimension. The failure to
find a relationship between the issue dimension and the per-
sonality scores makes the original hypothesis less tenable.
However, it is possible that personality development is
related to individual development in terms of each issue di-
mension, but that the relationship is too subtle to be cor-
related directly with an issue dimension. Rather it might
be more probable that the personality measures relate to the
degree to which a subject discriminates on a particular di-
mension. It is possible that the personality measures dis-
criminate among the four groups of subjects indicating that
the subjects have personality profiles which are related to
their developmental profiles on each dimension. I propose
that future analysis should include a discriminant analysis
of the groups on the basis of the personality measures. In
fact, I have already begun such analysis. The results of
this discriminant analysis indicate that the personality
measures do discriminate among the groups with better than
50 percent accuracy. The final results of this analysis
will be presented in a future study.
The inability to scale the issue dimensions on an un-
derlying dimension of difficulty suggests that the basis for
the development of each dimension is not innate within
the
nature of the issues which make up the dimensions
themselves.
This finding suggests that it is possible that
it is the in-
dividual's own experiences which cause him/her to
develop
1 30
and articulate specific dimensions.
Previous research in moral development and in language
development support this concept. Turiel (1968) suggests
that one basis for the difference between the rate of moral
development among subjects in more cosmopolitan urban soci-
eties compared to rural societies is the degree of social
complexity encountered by the individual subjects. That is,
that the degree of social complexity, in terms of the number
of roles an individual may carry out, may be greater in more
urban and technologically more advanced societies; such an
increase in role-taking opportunities may increase the
chances of inducing cognitive conflicts. I would propose
that in addition to direct cognitive conflicts the greater
degree of social complexity creates more instances of an is-
sue which the subject must assimilate into his/her defini-
tion of an issue dimension thereby creating more opportunity
for recursive definition of an issue dimension and creating
greater opportunity to implement higher order role-taking
processes and the associated higher stages of a justice
s true ture
.
Recommendations for further research
The fact that factor analysis reveals specific issue
dimensions which relate to subjects’ reasoning in a moral
dilemma suggests a need for further research to
determine
and extent of the relationship. Consequent-the full nature
1 7>l
ly I suggest that the following study be carried out.
First, that a larger subject population than that utilized
in this study be examined using moral dilemmas which include
social responsibility issue conflicting with legal issues as
well as other issues, especially punishment issues as iden-
tified previously. Second, that a multid imens i ona 1 scaling
(MDS) technique be employed to determine if individuals rate
moral issues along the same specific dimensions as those di-
mensions identified by factor analytic procedure of the sub-
jects’ test scores. MDS programs such as PROFIT give an in-
dividual measure as well as a group measure of an individ-
ual's discrimination and articulation of a dimension; this
fact permits the examination of results on an individual ba-
sis. MDS procedure would also permit the researcher to re-
late an individual's moral issue scores directly to the same
individual's position on specific issue dimensions which had
been defined by MDS procedures. The examination of such re-
lationships would indicate whether or not a subject with a
specific moral development profile did indeed differentiate
a specific set of dimensions and if so to what degree he or
she was able to articulate on those dimensions.
The results of such a study would help reveal more
clearly the extent to which moral development is related
to
the differentiation and articulation of issue dimensions.
Such research would hopefully encourage further
research to
determine if there is a correlation between moral
develop-
merit and environmental stimulation. The degree to which cn
vironmenta 1 stimulation is related to moral development has
broad implications for educational programs.
Implications for moral developmental theory
These research findings suggest three questions about
moral developmental theory as it is presently conceived.
First, what is the total number of issue dimensions; second,
how does development along each dimension affect moral de-
velopment as a whole; third, what is the most appropriate
way in which to refer to an individual's stage of develop-
ment in order to foster further development?
In reference to the number of issues dimension, the
fact that three were identified suggests that there may in-
deed be more dimensions. The facts that the Guttman scale
analysis indicated that the dimensions could not be ranked
on an underlying continuum of difficulty and that each of
the four Q groups showed a different profile in each dimen-
sion suggest that the issue dimensions may be situation or
experience specific and that they are not content free.
In terms of a theory of development, these findings
raise questions about the nature of cognitive moral develop
ment. For instance, what is the effect of higher stage rea
soning on one issue dimensions for raising reasoning level
on another dimension? Kohlberg suggests that presenting
reasoning one stage beyond the subject's own at appropriate
periods during his/her development will foster development.
The question must now be raised as to whether or not the ex-
amples of higher stage reasoning must be issue specific.
Moreover, in terms of the concept of appropriate periods
during development in which to foster change, is it possible
to be open to growth on one dimension and closed on another
dimension?
Finally the findings in this study suggest that there
is a unitary concept that can be referred to as moral reason-
ing as evidenced by the high loadings on the first unrotated
factor, however that this concept is composed of a yet to be
determined number of issue dimensions. The discovery of the
existence of these dimensions suggests that a person's rea-
soning can be more accurately portrayed as a profile than as
a global score.
In reference to scoring moral development protocols,
the failure to find a correlation between moral reasoning
stages on each issue dimension and specific personality di
mensions suggests that the search for items for a machine
scorable measure of moral judgment must take a different
approach
.
Implications for education
The identification of social role issue and legal issue
dimensions suggests that it would be appropriate to
attempt
to foster development along these dimensions.
Citizens who
do not understand their rights and responsibilities in a
democratic society stand in peril of losing their rights.
At present there is an effort to develop a new law and ci-
tizenship curriculum for use in public schools. The intent
of this curriculum is to focus students' attention on a ci-
tizen's rights and responsibilities in relation to law. I
believe that such a curriculum would be most successful if
it included the concepts of cognitive development identified
in this study.
However, regardless of whether or not schools adopt a
specific curriculum to foster moral development, educators
and teachers should begin to examine their own as well as
their students' level of moral reasoning more closely. Edu-
cators and education administrators should be mindful that
the reasoning which they use to answer the issues constitu-
ting the dilemmas in which they often find themselves wiil
go a long way to foster growth in students or to put a ceil-
ing on the pupils' upper limits for growth.
Recently Kohlberg has come to conclude that the nation'
public schools are not really "just communities" capable of
fostering principled moral reasoning. Rather that most
schools embody reasoning at Stage 4 and seldom display ex-
amples of reasoning at a higher level (Stewart, 197S, p. 6).
To the extent that an individual teacher or the
educational
institution is unprepared to recognize principled moral
is-
sues or to help the child recognize them the
teacher or the
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institution may be responsible for stifling development.
The effect of such an educational environment is to make all
children disadvantaged.
In short the dignity of the individual and the strength
of a democracy is dependent on the ability of the individual
to make moral judgments and bear moral responsibilities.
Public education’s first goal in a democracy is not to as-
sist the advance of knowledge directly but to guarantee that
every legitimate interest be able to make itself known and
felt in the political process. Justice, not truth, is the
ideal served by public primary and secondary education.
Modern democracy in its inception was a gamble because
in all history there is no record of any society in which a
large portion of the members could take a good hard look at
life without breaking and running. The examined life has
always been pretty well confined to a privileged class.
Liberal thought has held that this confinement was deliber-
ate. The most important privilege of a privileged class is
freedom from the vicissitudes of fortune. Its members are
running the show and can divert much that is disagreeable
elsewhere. It is often easier, therefore, for them to be
honest with themselves about what they see and about what it
portends
.
The common man or woman, exposed as he or she is to
economic, social, and personal pressures, has never fully
shared in the tradition of governing. They have not re-
1 36
ceived the protections of status and property on which the
tradition was based. Sources of security and status lead to
a clearer sense of self. The common individual in the
street is just as trustworthy and just as brave as a member
of the ruling elite, but he or she is far less sure of him
or herself. They cannot count of their nerves and judgment
as well in a threatening situation; moreover, situations
have more power to threaten them. The common person is much
more vulnerable; he or she has a much shorter lease on life.
The public school in a democracy must serve people who lack
the traditional protections enjoyed by those who taught us
what to expect of an educated class. In a democracy every
individual must behave as a ruler of people, an individual's
education must be one which will allow him or her the large
measure of responsibility, detachment, and exposure neces-
sary to make principled judgments. Such judgments call for
autonomy on the part of the individual, it asks a person to
make his or her own decisions and stimulates the individual
to think out the principles or goals on which he or she is
to base his or her decision.
The gamble is still on, and we are still betting on
creating and maintaining a society founded on justice and
equality; but the outcome seems now somewhat more dubious
than it did in Jefferson's time, because a century and a
half of experience makes it clear that people do not always
their freedom to chose actions in accordance with theuse
1 7,7
dictates of principled reasoning.
Democracy has been faithful in its support of public
education; but it is a serious question whether public edu-
cation can be as faithful to democracy without a strong com
mitment to the development of principled moral judgment.
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APPENDIX A
Moral Judgment Situations and Probing Questions
III. In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind
of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors
thought might save her. It was a form of radium that
a druggist in the same town had recently discovered.
The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was
charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. lie
paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a
small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband,
Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money,
but he could only get together about $1,000 which is
half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his
wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or
let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I dis-
covered the drug and I'm going to make money from it."
So Heinze got desperate and broke into the man's store
to steal the drug for his wife.
1. Should Heinz steal the drug? Why?
2. Which is worse, letting someone die or stealing? Why?
2a. What does the value of life mean to you?
3. Is there a good reason for a husband to steal i f he
doesn't love his wife?
4. Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as
his
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wife? Why?
5. Suppose he was stealing it for a pet he loved dearly.
Would it be right to steal for the pet? Why?
6. Heinz steals the drug and is caught. Should the judge
sentence him or should he let him go free? Why?
7. The judge thinks of letting him go free. What would he
his reasons for doing so?
8. Thinking in terms of society, what would be the best
reason for the judge to give him some sentence?
9. Thinking in terms of society, what would be the best
reasons for the judge to not give him some sentence?
IV. The drug didn’t work, and there was no other treatment
known to medicine which could save Heinz's wife, so the
doctor knew that she had only about six months to live.
She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a
good dose of a pain-killer like ether or morphine would
make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost
crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask
the Doctor to give her enough ether to kill her. She
said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to
die in a few months anyway.
1. Should the doctor give her the drug that would make her
die? Why?
2. The woman is sure she wants to die. Should her husband
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try to convince her and the doctor to keep her alive as
long as possible? Why?
3. What does the husband have to do with the decision,
anyhow?
4. Do you think the woman should have the right to make
the decision to die or should the right to decide be up
to the doctors and the courts? Why?
5. What should the doctor do if he wants to respect the
woman’s rights? Why?
6. In what sense does a person have a duty or obligation
to live when they don’t want to, when they want to com-
mit suicide?
7. Why is mercy- ki 1 1 ing humans so different from mercy-
killing animals? Why is there a difference between
animals and human life?
8. What kind of general guidelines concerning mercy-kill-
ing should be set for doctors and who should set them?
9. The doctor kills the woman and is brought to court. He
is found guilty of murder. The usual sentence is life
imprisonment. What should the judge do? Why?
10. The judge considers being lenient or letting the doctor
off. What should the judge think about the doctor and
what he did which would make him lenient?
11. The judge has to think about society. From society's
point of view, what is the best reason for the judge to
give the doctor a sentence?
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12. From society’s point of view, what is the best reason
for the judge to let the doctor go free?
VII. Two young men, brothers, had gotten into serious trou-
ble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and
needed money. Karl, the older one, broke into a store
and stole $500. Bob, the younger one, went to a re-
tired old man who was known to help people in town.
Bob told the man that he was very sick and needed $500
to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at
all, and he had no intention of paying the man back.
Although the man didn't know Bob very well, he loaned
him the money. So Bob and Karl skipped town, each
with $500.
1. Which would be worse, stealing like Karl or cheating
like Bob? Why?
2. Suppose Bob had gotten the loan from a bank with no in-
tention of paying it back. Is borrowing from the bank
or the old man worse? Why?
3. What do you feel is the worst thing about cheating the
old man?
4. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store?
5. What is the value or importance of property rights?
6. Which would be worse in terms of society s welfare,
cheating like Bob or stealing like Karl? Why?
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7. Would your conscience feel worse if you cheated like
Bob or stole like Karl? Why?
8. What do people mean by conscience? What do you think
of your conscience? What do you think of your consci-
ence and what does it do?
9. Is there anything about your sense of conscience which
is special or different from that of most people? What
and why?
10.
How do people get or develop a conscience?
XX (Substituted for Kohlberg's dilemma XX)
The Pentagon Papers are by now notorious for several
reasons. One of the reasons they are remembered is be-
cause of the crises they caused in the law court over
freedom of the press. Daniel Ellsbcrg released the pa-
pers to several major United States Newspapers, one of
these was the New York Times . The United States Gov-
ernment took the New York Times to court to block their
publication of the Pentagon Papers. It was the Govern-
ment's contention that further publication of informa-
tion of the character which was contained in the Penta-
gon Papers would cause irreparable injury to the de-
fense interests of the United States. Ihc New Yox.ll
Times claimed the position that the public had an in-
herent "right to know" which was guaranteed in the
First Amendment. In response to the Government argu-
1 so
ments the New York Times responded that "as a newspaper
that takes seriously its obligations and its responsi-
bilities to the public, we believe that, once this ma-
terial fell into our hands, it was not only in the in-
terests of the American people to publish it but, even
more emphatically, it would have been an abnegation of
responsibility and a renunciation of our obligations
under the First Amendment not to publish it."
1. Was the government right to order the New York Times to
stop the Pentagon Papers? Why or why not?
2. Should the New York Times have obeyed the Government's
request to stop publishing the Pentagon Papers? Why or
why not?
3. If the Supreme Court had ordered the T imes to stop pub-
lishing the Pentagon Papers should the T imes have
obeyed that order? Why or why not?
4. In the first place, should newspapers be allowed to
publish information which is highly critical of the
government or American society?
5. If the publishing of the Pentagon Papers had caused an
international incident, should the Times have been per-
mitted to continue to print them? Why or why not?
XI. Mrs. Webster's Rooming House
When her husband died five years earlier, Mrs. Webster
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converted her house in Springfield, Massachusetts, into
a rooming house which would hold seven roomers. The
rent from the rooming house provided her with just
enough money to make ends meet
.
All of her roomers were white and Mrs. Webster knew
them very well. They told her that if she ever rented
a room to a Negro they would move out. If this happen-
ed she would receive much less money than the small
amount she now received. But she also knew that if she
refused a Negro a room she could get into trouble be-
cause the Massachusetts open housing law made it ille-
gal for her to refuse to rent a room to a person be-
cause of his color.
A young black man, Mr. Jones, had just received a job
in town. He had looked around the town all one day
without success and toward evening noticed the sign,
"Room for Rent," in front of Mrs. Webster's house.
When he asked Mrs. Webster about the room, she told
him that she had just rented the room and that there
were no more left. Tn fact, there were two vacant
rooms in her house at the time.
1. Was it right for Mrs. Webster to refuse to rent a room
to Mr. Jones? Why or why not?
Some states do not have open housing laws. IT there
was no law in Massachusetts, would it be right for Mrs.
2 .
Webster to refuse to rent a room to Mr. Jones? Why or
why not?
3. Does the fact that there is a state law making it ille-
gal for Mrs. Webster to refuse the room to Mr. Jones
influence your decision? Why or why not?
4. Was the state right to pass such an open housing law?
Why or why not?
5. Should Mrs. Webster have the right to say who lives in
her rooming house?
6. Would it be right for Mr. Jones to take Mrs. Webster to
court if he knew her situation? Why or why not?
VIII. In a country in Europe, a poor man named Valjean
could find no work, nor could his sister and brother.
Without money, he stole food and medicine that they
needed. He was captured and sentenced to prison, he
escaped, and went to live in another part of the
country under a new name. He saved money and slowly
built up a big factory. He gave his workers the
highest wages and used most ol his profits to build
a hospital for people who couldn't afford medical
care. Twenty years later a tailor recognized the
factory owner as being Valjean, the escaped convict
whom the police had been looking for back in his home
town
.
1. Should the tailor report Valjean to the police? Would
it be right or wrong to keep it quiet? Why?
2. What would be the best or most important reason for
reporting him?
3. What would be the best or most important reason for
keeping him quiet?
4. If Valjean were reported and brought before the judge,
should the judge send him back to jail? Why?
5. Would it be unfair or unjust to send him back to jail
or would it still be just? Why?
6. Suppose that Valjean had escaped from jail and lived an
ordinary life, instead of building a hospital to help
other sick people. Should the tailor report him in
that case? Should he be sent to jail? Why?
7. Does a citizen have a duty or obligation to report an
escaped convict?
8. According to the law, a citizen is required to report
an escaped convict. Is it morally right to fail to re-
port him that case? Why?
9. Suppose Valjean was a close friend of the tailor, does
that make a difference in what he should do? Why?
THE HIGH SCHOOL NEWSPAPER (Kohlberg's dilemma XX)
Fred Berger, a senior at Kitsap High School, near
Seattle, Washington, thought of putting out a mimeo-
graphed newspaper for students which would express many
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of his strong feelings. In particular, he wanted to
voice his opposition to the war in Viet Nam and to many
of the school’s regulations, like the one forbidding
boys to wear long hair. Fred was a consistent high
honor student and one of the three chosen by the facul-
ty as "outstanding students." lie was also a student
council representative and a regional winner of a "What
Democracy Means to Me" contest, which was sponsored by
a national patriotic group.
Before publishing his newspaper, Fred asked his princi-
pal for permission. The principal agreed on the condi-
tion that Fred submit all his articles to him for ap-
proval. Fred agreed and began to submit his articles.
The principal approved all of them and Fred published
two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.
But the principal did not think about the great atten-
tion that Fred's newspaper would receive. Students
read the paper eagerly and began to organize against
the hair regulation and other school rules. Many
classes were spent talking about the paper and rallies
were held before and after school. Furthermore, many
parents who favored the Viet Nam war phoned the prin-
cipal and angrily told him that the newspaper was un-
patriotic and should not be published.
As a result of the commotion, the principal ordered
Fred to stop publishing the newspaper. He gave as a
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reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the op-
eration of the school.
1. Was the principal right to order Fred to stop publishing
his paper? Why or why not?
2. Does the fact that the principal made an agreement with
Fred and then broke it affect your decision? Why or
why not?
3. Does the fact that the principal is the highest author-
ity in the school affect your decision? Why or why not?
4. Should Fred obey the principal's order? Why or why not?
5. In the first place, should Fred have been allowed to
publish a paper in his school that was critical of the
school and society? Why or why not?
6. If Fred, in his newspaper, argued in favor of dropping
nuclear bombs on North Viet Nam and China and also ar-
gued strongly that Negroes, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans
were inferior to whites and should be segregated, would
that affect your decision? Why or why not? How?
APPENDIX B
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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY SCALE ITEMS
1. It is no use worrying about current events or public
affairs; I can't do anything about them anyway.
Strongly agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly disagree
2. Every person should give some of his time for the good
of his town or country.
Strongly agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly disagree
3. Our country would be a lot better off if we didn't have
so many elections and people didn't have to vote so
often.
Strongly agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly disagree
4. Letting your friends down is not so bad because you
can't do good all the time for everybody.
Strongly agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly disagree
5. It is the duty of each person to do his job the very
best he can.
Strongly agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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6. People would be a lot better off if they could livetar away from other people and never have to do any-thing for them.
Strongly agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly disagree
7. At school I usually volunteered for special projects.
Strongly agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly disagree
8. I feel very bad when I have failed to finish a job I
promised I would do.
Strongly agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly disagree
158
APPENDIX C
Machiavellian Scale Items
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree by circling the number below
each statement. The numbers and their meaning are indicated
below
.
If you agree strongly
,
circle +3.
If you agree somewhat
,
circle +2.
If you agree slightly
,
circle +1.
If you d isagree slightly
,
circle -1.
If you disagree somewha t
,
circle -2.
If you disagree strongly
,
circle -3.
First impressions are usually best in such matters. Read
each statement, decide if you agree or disagree and the
strength of your opinion, and then circle the appropriate
number below the statement. Give your opinion on every
statement .
If you find that the numbers to be used in answering do not
adequately indicate your opwn opinion, use the one which is
closest to the way you feel.
STATEMENTS:
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something,
unless it is useful to do so.
-3 -2 -1 +1 + 2 +3
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they
want to hear.
3.
4.
-3 -2 -1 +1 + 2 +3
One should take action only when sure it is morally
right
.
_3 -2 -1 + 1 +2 +3
Most people are basically good and kind.
+ 1 +2 +3
-3 -2 -1
1 60
5
.
6 .
7 .
8 .
9 .
10 .
11 .
12 .
13 .
14 .
It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious
streak and it will come out when they are given a
chance
.
-3
-2
-1 +1 +2 +3
Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
"3 -2
-1 +l +2 +3
There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
-3 -2
-1 +1 +2 +3
Generally speaking, men won’t work hard unless they're
forced to do so.
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than
to be important and dishonest.
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
When you ask someone to do something for you, it is
best to give the real reasons for wanting it rather
than giving reasons which carry more weight.
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean,
moral lives.
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for
trouble
.
-3 -2 -1 +1 + 2 +3
The biggest difference between most criminals and othci
people is that the criminals are stupid enough to get
caught
.
_3 -2 -1 + 1 +2 +3
Most men are brave.
+ 1 + 2 +3
-3 -2 -1
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15. It is wise to flatter important people.
-3
-2
-1 +i +2 +3
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
~3
-2 -1 +i +2 +3
17. Barnum was wrong when he said that there's a sucker
born every minute.
-3 -2
-1 +1 +2 +3
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here
and there.
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
19. People suffering from incurable diseases should have
the choice of being put painlessly to death.
-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father
than the loss of their property.
+ 1 +2 +3-3 -2 -1
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APPENDIX D
Ascription of Responsibility Items
1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Strongly Disagree
1. If a good friend of mine wanted to injure
an enemy of his, it would be my duty to
try to stop him. 1234
2. Failing to return the money when you are
given too much change is the same as
stealing from a store. 1234
3. I wouldn't feel that I had to do my part
in a group project if everyone else was
lazy, 1234
4. If I hurt someone unintentionally, I would
feel almost as guilty as I would if I had
done the same thing intentionally. 1234
5. Gossiping is so common in our society that
a person who gossips once in a while can't
really be blamed so much. 1234
6. When a person is nasty to me, I feel very
little responsibility to treat him well. 1234
7. I would feel less bothered about leaving
litter in a dirty park than in a clean
8. No matter what a person has done to us,
there is no excuse for taking advantage
of him.
9. When a man is completely involved in
valuable work, you can't blame him if he
is insensitive to those around him.
10.
If I damaged someone's car in an accident
that was legally his fault, I would still
feel somewhat guilty.
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1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Strongly Disagree
11 .
12
.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20 .
21 .
When you consider how hard it is for an
honest businessman to get ahead, it is
easier to forgive shrewdness in business. 1234
When a person is pushed hard enough, there
comes a point beyond which anything he
does is justifiable. 1234
Even if something you borrow is defective,
you should still replace it if it gets
broken. 1234
You can't blame basically good people who
are forced by their environment to be
inconsiderate of others. 1234
No matter how much a person is provoked,
he is always responsible for whatever he
does. 1234
Being upset or preoccupied does not excuse
a person for doing anything he would ordin-
arily avoid. 1234
As long as a businessman doesn't break
laws, he should feel free to do his busi-
ness as he sees fit. 1234
Occasionally in life a person finds
self in a situation in which he has
lutely no control over what he does
o the rs .
him-
abso-
to 12 3 4
I would feel obligated to do
a person who needed it , even
not shown gratitude for past
a favor for
though he had
favors
.
1 2 3 4
With the pressure for grades and the wide-
spread cheating in school nowadays, the
individual who cheats occasionally is not
really as much at fault. 1234
I wouldn't feel badly about giving offense
to someone if my intentions had been good. 1234
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1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Strongly Disagree
22. Extenuating circumstances never completely
remove a person’s responsibility for his
actions
. 12 3 4
23. You can't expect a person to act much
differently from everyone else. 1234
24. It doesn't make much sense to be very
concerned about how we act when we are
sick and feeling miserable. 1234
25.
You just can't hold a store clerk respon-
sible for being rude and impolite at the
end of a long work day. 1234
26. Professional obligations can never justify
neglecting the welfare of others. 1234
27. If I broke a machine through mishandling,
I would feel less guilty if it was al-
ready damanged before I used it. 1234
28. When you have a job to do, it is impossi-
ble to look out for everybody's best in-
terests. 12 3 4
APPENDIX E
Final Items for Each of the Pole Scales
The items were not administered to the subject as
shown (i.e, all the items from a given scale concentrated
together); rather items from all the poles were mixed to-
gether and grouped according to thei response categories.
Here the True-False items are presented first, then the mul-
tiple choice items.
Pole 1 -
-
Authority Glorification
,
Absolutism
(T) Parents are much too easy on their children nowadays.
(T) One of the major causes of juvenile delinquency is that
parents are too easy on their children nowadays.
(T) Other countries don’t appreciate as much as they should
all the help that America has given them.
(T) Now that America is the leading country in the world,
it's only natural that other countries should try to be
like us.
(T) I would rather be a steady and dependable worker
than a brilliant but unstable one.
(T) It is a pretty callous person who does not feel love
and gratitude for his parents.
(T) Speaking softly, but carry a big stick.
(F) Students are frequently justified in violating school
regulations .
(T) There may be a few exceptions, but, in general, members
of a racial group tend to be pretty much alike.
(T) I believe it is a responsibility of intelligent leader-
ship to maintain the established order of things.
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Ple a s e indicate whether you Strongly Agree, Agree, are Unde-
cided, Disagree, or Strongly Disagree with the following
statements:
It is often necessary to remind pupils that their status in
school differs from that of teachers. (SA)
The best principals give unquestioning support to
in disciplining pupils. (SA)
teachers
It is more important for pupils to learn to obey rules than
that they make their own decisions. (SA)
Pupils cannot perceive the difference between democracy and
anarchy in the classroom. (SA)
Pole 2-- Anti-authority
,
Freedom From
I have always hated regulations. (T)
I find that a well-ordered mode of life with regular hours
is not congenial to my temperament. (T)
I regard myself as a more consistent and harder worker in my
classroom assignments than the typical student in my classes.
(F)
I do not mind taking orders and being told what to do. (F)
I would rather be a brilliant but unstable worker than a
steady and dependable one. (T)
I have often either broken rules (school, club, etc.) or in-
wardly rebelled against them. (T)
I never cared much for school. (T)
I think I would like to belong to a motorcycle club. (T)
At times I have been so entertained by the cleverness of a
crook that I hoped he would get by with it. (T)
When the community makes a decision, it is up to a person to
help carry it out even if he had been against it. ( )
I must admit I find it very hard to work under strict rules
and regulations. (T)
I think I could do better than most of the present
politi-
cians if I were in office. (T)
Police cars should be especially marked so that you can al-
ways see them coming. (T)
I have often gone against my parents' wishes. (T)
No censorship on the presumed morality of books and movies
can be justified. (T)
At times I have very much wanted to leave home. (T)
Indicate whether you feel that for you the following are Not
at All Important, Not Too Important, About Average, Quite
Important or Very Important:
Working hard to attain the good things of life honestly.
(NAI
)
Pole 3-
-
Field Dependence
,
Social Anxiety
I worry about what people will think of me even when I know
it doesn't make any difference. (T)
Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people
think of me. (T)
I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things. (T)
I often worry that people who are important to me won't think
very much of me. (T)
I rarely worry about seeming foolish to others. (F)
I am afraid people will find fault with me. (T)
I don't like things to be uncertain and unpredictable. (F)
It doesn't bother me when things are uncertain and unpre-
dictable. (F)
I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on
someone. (F)
I feel very upset when I commit some social error. (T)
I should like to belong to several clubs or lodges. (T)
I usually try to do what is expected of me, and to
avoid
criticism. (T)
I like to have a place for everything and everything in itsplace. (T)
I don t like to undertake any project unless 1 have a prettygood idea as to how it will turn out. (T)
Even when I have gotten into trouble I was usually trying to
do the right thing. (T)
Indicate whether you feel that for you the following are Not
at All Important, Not Too Important, About Average, Quite
Important or Very Important:
Achieving success. (VI)
Trying always to act in a socially acceptable manner. (VI)
Pole 4 -
-
Self Absorption
,
Freedom to
Indicate whether you feel that for you the following are Not
at All Important, Not Too Important, About Average, Quite
Important or Very Important:
Finding the center or real meaning for life within myself,
e.g., self-awareness. (VI)
Being aware of and understand my innermost thoughts. (VI)
Finding inner peace and contentment through self-understand-
ing and independence. (VI)
Having time to think about the deep issues of my personal
life. (VI)
Having much freedom at home, school and work. (VI)
Having confidence in my personal strength and ability to do
things on my own. (VI)
Cherishing personal privacy and the chance it affords me sim-
ply be myself. (VI)
Finding the most enduring satisfactions within myself. (VI)
Realizing that though the world is disappointing I can tiiul
happiness in me. (VI)
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1
-
" Active Interdependence
, Collaboration
I nd icate
ties are
Wor thwhil
whether you feel that for you the following
Worthless, Not Too Worthwhile, About Average
e, or Very Worthwhile.
acti vi
-
,
Quite
Working with a committee to prepare a lesson to present tothe class. (VW)
Going to the library with your committee to do research
(VW)
Working with other studies in designing and completing a
project. (VW)
Evaluating the quality of committee work with other group
members. (VW)
Preparing on your own to make a report to the class. (VW)
Being a member of a committee that plans a special event
for the class. (VW)
Doing research in the library for your term paper. (VW)
Having a conference with the teacher concerning your pro-
gress in class. (VW)
Organizing a group activity with a few other students. (VW)
Discussing with the teacher possible activities you could
do. (VW)
Discussing class material with a group of other students.
(VW)
Having planning sessions in which the whole class is in-
volved. (VW)
APPENDIX F
Scoring I rocedures for the Eiseman Measure of
Personality Development
The procedures for deriving the derivative scores for
the Eiseman measure are given below. To understand the pro-
cedures requires the explanation of the concept of openness
and Eiseman’ s concept of differentiation. The following de-
finitions and concepts are taken from Eiseman (1972), pp.
140-141; 152-154. Eiseman states:
The Concept of Openness
To facilitate the explanation of the operationalization
of the concept of openness, some terminology will be pre-
sented. First, to avoid cumbersome sentences, the terms
"Pole X" and "Pole Y" are occasionally used to refer to any
pole in general. Further, the phrase "Pole X is open" is a
shorthand way of saying that "the individual’s representa-
tional structure is open." Finally, ”P(X)" refers to an in-
dividual’s score on Pole X.
Now, then: to operationalize the concept of openness,
an arbitrary cutoff point was set as a criterion for decid-
ing whether or not a pole is open. Specifically, Pole X is
considered "open" <f P(X) < 110; in other words, an individ-
ual's representational structure is considered open to Pole
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X if the individual's score on Pole X is greater than or
equal to half a standard deviation above the mean. As the
individual can intuit from this definition of openness, Pole
X is considered "closed" if P(X) < 110.
Note that the concept of pole openness thus defined is
not an intrapersonal concept. Thus, if the poles are nor-
mally distributed, approximately 31 percent of a population
would be open to Pole X and 69 percent would be closed to
it
.
The Concept of Differentiation
Differentiation is considered to be directional in na-
ture. Thus, the phrase "Pole X is differentiated from Pole
Y" implies that Pole X is more developmentally advanced
than Pole Y. To operationalize the concept of differentia-
tion, two criteria were established. The statement 'Pole X
is differentiated from Pole Y" implies both that P(X) _ 110
and (PC X) - P(Y)) - 10. In other words, Pole X must be open,
and further, the individual's score on Pole X must be greater
than or equal to half a standard deviation more than his
score on Pole Y
.
Purepole
To be included in the sample which received
a Purepole
only had to have one of his poles bescore, a subject not
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open- -P (X) > 110-
-but that pole had to be "differentiated
from" 1 all the other poles. If he was eligible to receive
a Purepole score, it merely consisted of the number of the
"completely differentiated" pole. For example, a Purepole
score of 4 implies both that P (4) >.110 and that [ P (4 ) -
P(Y) l 10, where the latter statement holds not only for
Y = 1, 2, and 3 but also for Y = 5. Here is a sample pro-
file which would qualify for a Purepole score of 4 (the
scores are in order from Pole 1 to Pole 5): 96 - 108 - 102 -
121 - 110. As one can see, those who receive Purpole scores
can be considered ideal types.
A1 loypole
To be included in the sample which received an Alloy-
pole score, the individual had to be open to a pole which
was also differentiated from all less developmentally ad-
vanced poles. This pole did not, however, need to be dif-
ferentiated from more developmentally advanced poles as it
would have had to be to receive a Purepole score. If he
qualified according to this criterion, his Alloypole score
consisted of the number of the most developmentally advanced
pole eligible. Here is a sample profile which would qualify
1 For Purepole and Fusion, the statement Pole X is dif
ferentiated from Pole Y" does not imply, as it does elsewhere
throughout the text, that Pole X is more developmentally ad-
vanced than Pole Y
.
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for an Alloypole score of 4: 96 - 108 - 102 - 121 - 126.
Everyone who received a score on the Purepole scale neces-
sarily received the same score on the Alloypole scale but
the reverse is not true; for example, the individual with
the Alloypole scale score of 4 mentioned above is ineligible
for a score on the Purepole scale. The reason he is ineli-
gible is that if his score on Pole 5 (126) is subtracted
from his score on Pole 4 (121), the remainder (-5) is not
greater than or equal to 10.
Fusion
The Fusion scale is similar to the Purepole scale but
the eligibility rules are liberalized. In a sense, Poles 2,
3, and 4 are fused into one cluster. Thus, if a subject re-
ceived a 1 or a 5 on the Purepole scale, he would also re-
ceive a 1 or a 5 respectively on the Fusion scale. But if
he received a 2, 3, or 4 on the Purepole scale, he would re-
ceive a 3 on the Fusion scale. In addition, however, he
would also receive a 3 on the Fusion scale if he were open
to either Pole 2, 3, or 4 whether or not that pole was dif-
ferentiated from the other two in the cluster, provided that
one of them was differentiated from both Poles 1 and 5.
Here is a profile which would lead to a Fusion score of 3:
101 - 128 - 106 )- 124 - 91
.
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Purepole-equivalent scores
To compute this score, the numbers of the poles to
which the subjects were open were averaged. For example,
an individual with the profile 91 - 106 - 128 - 113 - 122
is ineligible to receive a Purepole score. He is open to
Poles 3, 4, and 5. The average of the numbers 3, 4, and 5
is 4, so the individual would receive a Purepole-equivalent
score of 4.
APPENDIX E
Case
Case
Case
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Discriminant Analysis of Four Q Factor Groups
in Terms of Discriminant Scores
SeqNum Group
Discriminant
1 2
Scores
3
2 1 - .110 -1.281
. 832
9 1 .033 -.102 - .773
14 1 -.833 -
. 309 -
. 398
16 1 -1.582 - .411 - .935
18 1 .268 - .691 -1.019
19 1 -
.
157
. 070 -
.
502
25 1 -2.019 -.516 .881
30 1 .653 - .673 .7 23
31 1 -2.130 - .369 .980
32 1 - .274 .622 - .515
SeqNum Group
Discriminant
1 2
Scores
3
3 2 .7 35 - .325 .933
4 2 1 .760 . 349 - .058
6 2 .723 - . 796 -1.193
7 2 - . 042 .439 .107
10 2 .272 .400 . 015
13 2 - .323 - . 267 -1.576
15 2 - .324 .272 1.523
23 2 - .648 1.121 1.390
27 2 1 .089 - .580 - .169
29 2 - . 321 - .577 1.580
Seq Num Group
Discriminant
1 2
Scores
3
1 3 - .927 - . 565 -1.485
8 3 .145 1 . 320 . 702
11 3 2.666 - .401 .732
17 3 -2.239 -1.419 -.114
20 3 - .017 1 . 368 - .912
21 3 - .036 1 . 338 - .706
22 3 - . 407 2.138 1.908
24 3 -1.041 1.927 - .520
33 3 -1.178 -1.534 - .481
Case
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SeqNum Group
Discriminant
1 2
Scores
3
5 4 1.431 - .622 .027
12 4 1 .752 - .695 - .551
26 4 1.0 86 2.076 -1.478
28 4 1.986 -1.308 1 . 051


